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Preface and Acknowledgements
This report is one outcome of a study into
privacy and human genetics initiated by
John Gillott and staff and trustees of the
Genetic Interest Group. 
The initial focus was on genetics and
human rights, with an emphasis on legal
aspects and policy decisions informed by
law and rights ideology. Article 8 of the
Human Rights Act 1998, the right to
respect for private and family life,1 is of
most relevance to this study, though other
Articles are considered. 
The study as a whole comprises two
broad strands of inquiry, reflecting those
areas in which privacy rights are most
relevant and have had the greatest impact:
the effect of law and ideology on research
and clinical practice, with a focus on
genetics; and human reproduction, again
with a particular focus on genetic aspects.
These two areas present contrasting
analytical challenges. While there is recent
law indirectly or directly relevant to
research and clinical practice (notably the
Human Tissue Act 2004), there is little or
no case law on the subject. In contrast, as
regards reproduction and genetics, there
have, over the past five years or so, been
a number of court decisions, at all levels
up to the House of Lords and the
European Court of Human Rights. We
therefore decided to publish the results of
our study into the two areas separately,
the better to highlight the key issues in
each subject area. This report is on the
first strand: the right to privacy in the
context of medical research using tissue
and data. 
Research for this report involved both
textual study and active participation in a
number of policy developments considered
in the text. Throughout the project, Dr
Kathy Liddell, University of Cambridge and
Cambridge Genetics Knowledge Park
acted as our Legal Advisor, contributing in
a variety of ways. We are also grateful to
the following people who attended a half-
day workshop that provided us with
valuable insights and feedback: Celia
Brazell; John Crolla; Peter Dukes; Chris
Friend; Laura Gilbert; Alison Hall; Jenny
Hewison; Dipak Kalra; Jane Kaye; Alastair
Kent; Justin Lambert; Philip Lord;
Catherine Moody; Rosemary Pattenden;
Maggie Ponder; Peter Singleton; David
Widdowson; and Andrew Wilkie.
Toby Andrew, John Crolla, Stuart
Derbyshire, Fiona Douglas, Michael
Fitzpatrick, Jenny Hewison, Alastair Kent,
Graeme Laurie, Maggie Ponder, Helen
Reece, Robert Souhami and Guy
Westwell provided valuable criticism and
comments on drafts of the report. Thanks
are particularly due to Philippa Brice and
Melissa Winter for final elements in the
production. Last, but by no means least,
we are grateful to the funders of this work,
The Wellcome Trust and The D J Fielding
Trust.
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1 For the sake of brevity we will refer to ‘the right to privacy’ rather than ‘the right to respect for private life’.
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Overview
This report traces the impact that the right
to privacy is having on the regulation of
medical research and clinical practice, with
a particular focus on implications for
human genetics. Less than 15 years ago,
English law categorically rejected the right
to privacy,2 and professional guidelines
encouraged researchers to see research
using health data as their moral duty
(without necessarily seeking consent or
research ethics committee approval).3
However, in the five years since the
implementation of the Human Rights Act
1998 and the Data Protection Act, the
situation has changed beyond recognition,
and this shift has shaken the medical and
scientific establishment to its very core.
Some wonder whether conducting
research is now too difficult (and
insufficiently appreciated) to be worth the
effort. Others pity the poor patients who, in
the absence of rigorous research, are
diagnosed and treated with products and
skills of uncertain efficacy and accuracy.
Most are wondering what the future holds. 
This report addresses the latter point by
analysing the directions that government
policy has been taking, and suggesting
some responses. We argue that the right
to privacy is being given too much weight
in the context of medical research and
clinical genetics, with insufficient reference
to wider rights law and court decisions.
This is creating political, legal and social
turmoil that is disruptive for the public,
regulators and the research community.
We outline a set of proposals for a more
reasonable and stable future, most
notably, a future that emphasises the
importance of cooperation and solidarity,
as well as individualism and choice.
In Section 1 we begin by examining the
most recent legislative implementation of
the right to privacy—the Human Tissue Act
2004 (HT Act). In particular, we highlight
some of the Parliamentary debates that
convey the government’s spirited and
sometimes perplexing defence of an
individual’s right to privacy regarding the
analysis and use of their tissue, cells and
DNA. This demonstrates that the
government has taken its program of
patient-centred consent-based practice
to extraordinary lengths. It also explains
why clinicians and researchers have
become increasingly concerned that the
public interest in medical research and
genetic testing for a family member’s
benefit is being overlooked, or not given
adequate weight. Although the
government amended its original Bill after
comments from the medical and scientific
communities, concessions to research
were piecemeal, diffident and on occasion,
virtually secret.
Section 2 shows that the increasingly
powerful impact of the right to privacy is
applauded by some academics, who
argue it is just and fair that privacy rights
should be broadly construed. In particular,
they interpret existing laws on the use of
data analogously to the legislative scheme
implemented for tissue in the HT Act.
Some want to go further still, questioning
the reality and utility of anonymisation in
the context of privacy rights. These
3
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2 Kaye v Robertson [1991] F.S.R. 62 (CA).
3 Michael P. Coleman, Barry G. Evans and Geraldine Barrett, Confidentiality and the public interest in medical research—will we ever
get it right?, Clinical Medicine, 2003, 3(3): 219-228.
interpretations have gained wide currency
and have had a significant impact on
research and clinical practice, leading
some scientists and institutions to adapt
practice to privacy-centric interpretations
of data laws. Specifically, automated
extraction of data, independent scrutiny of
data analysis during research, the
manipulation of data to obscure the
identity of research subjects and patient
participation in governance arrangements
have all been put forward as measures to
address the perceived failings of existing
approaches.
In the conclusions to Section 2, where we
note that many patients are willing to
accept current practices if they can be
shown to be necessary, then on through
the remainder of the report, we outline the
legal and political basis for a different
approach.
Section 3 compares the recent legislative
developments on tissue with those in
earlier years in relation to data. Legislative
changes regarding data occurred around
the time the Human Rights Act 1998 was
passed and the right to privacy first
entered the English regulatory field. The
differences between the law on data and
tissue demonstrate that the right to
privacy, at least in the government’s mind,
has been growing more, rather than less,
important. The differences also
demonstrate, contrary to some of the
recent interpretation of the data laws
considered in Section 2, that the earlier
data protection laws contained a balance
between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the public interest in research
and the health needs of other individuals
on the other. This balance has been lost
sight of, in part due to confusions
embodied in recommendations and
guidance from a number of governing
bodies, in particular the General Medical
Council and the Patient Information
Advisory Group (PIAG).
In Section 4 we show that the legal basis
for developing a less privacy-centric
approach is reinforced once the views of
the judiciary are taken into account. The
judicial system is the social institution that
has the power to decide ultimately whether
any activity unlawfully interferes with
fundamental human rights embodied in the
Human Rights Act 1998. The views of
judges are thus a useful means of
assessing whether the government’s
implementation of the right to privacy and
the emphasis given to consent are
excessive. This part of the analysis is not
straightforward, since the courts have not
yet been asked to decide a case
concerning clinical genetics or information-
based medical research. That said, much
can be gleaned from two recent decisions
by the House of Lords about health and
genetic information. It is clear that the
courts consider that the right to privacy
protected by the Human Rights Act 1998
shifted the law in some significant
respects. Most notably, it crystallised the
value of autonomy and dignity in the law of
confidentiality, thereby expanding
individuals’ right to protect ‘private’
information. However, the judiciary was
equally careful to point out that the right to
privacy is qualified by certain public
interests, including the protection of health,
the investigation of crime, and the rights of
others (including the right to free
4
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expression). The important message from
the courts is that the right to privacy is
extensive, but also extensively qualified.
Interferences in privacy, even if
substantial, are considered just if they are
necessary and proportionate to protect
public interests. From this, we argue that
recent developments in tissue law and the
interpretation of data laws unduly
emphasise the right to privacy. We
conclude, however, with a cautionary point
on the importance of political and cultural
factors: the value society attaches to an
activity has an influence on legal
decisions, although this has yet to be
tested regarding issues in research and
clinical practice.
Section 5, the concluding section,
summarises the predicament facing
researchers. It is plain, we argue, that the
government has been pushing the
boundaries of a balanced interpretation of
the right to privacy. It wishes to cement
support for some of its flagship policies,
including the electronic health care
record,4 using the rhetoric of consumer
choice and patient-centred care. Like
many others, it has drawn tenuous
conclusions from the Alder Hey organ
retention controversy, to the effect that
researchers are not trusted and that
research (unlike audit) is an optional frill in
evidence-based care. The key question for
the research and genetics communities is
how to react. We discuss several
proposals that have been put forward,
including a model of implied consent, and
a comprehensive programme for reform
from the Academy of Medical Sciences.
We conclude on a political note.
Professionals critical of the government’s
policy are aware that they have a powerful
and important story to tell, and a degree of
public support for their case, but they
remain uncomfortable with the position in
which they find themselves—out of favour
with sections of the government and their
values questioned—and wary of
presenting their own concerns too
forcefully in public. Difficult though it may
be, there is a pressing need to take the
issues into political and public arenas; to
make the case for the value of research
and to explain the means as well as the
ends of research to a wider audience.
1 The Human Tissue Act 2004
1.1 Background5
For many years, the Human Tissue Act
1961 governed the taking of tissue from
deceased persons. It stated that a person
lawfully in possession of a deceased
person was authorised to remove tissue
for medical education or research if
‘having made such reasonable enquiry as
may be practicable, he has no reason to
believe’ that the deceased person had
previously objected or that any surviving
relative objects.6 Consent was not an
absolute requirement, and no particular
penalty was stipulated for breaching the
1961 Act.7 A survey by England’s Chief
Medical Officer in the wake of the Alder
Hey and Bristol inquiries in 2001 found
5
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4 This is the most expensive public IT program of its generation.
5 This section draws on Kathleen Liddell and Alison Hall, Beyond Bristol and Alder Hey: The Future Regulation of Human Tissue,
Medical Law Review, 2005, 13: 170-223.
6 Human Tissue Act 1961, s 1(2).
7 Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law: Text with Materials, Butterworths, London, 3rd Edition, 2000.
that more than 54,000 organs, body parts,
stillborn children, or fetuses had been
retained since 1970. A significant
proportion of this collection was compiled
without specific consent. Against this
background the 1961 Act was declared to
be too vague, ‘complex and obscure’, and
‘outmoded and paternalistic’ for the
modern biotechnological era.8 Or as the
medical lawyer and chair of the Retained
Organs Commission, Professor Margaret
Brazier, stated: ’it was a toothless tiger
imposing fuzzy rules with no provision for
sanctions or redress’.9
Accordingly, the Human Tissue Act 1961
was repealed for England and Wales and
replaced by the HT Act 2004.10 The latter
Act indicates more clearly the situations in
which consent is required before taking,
storing or using a deceased person’s body
or tissue from their body after a hospital
post-mortem, and identifies those who
may give consent on behalf of a deceased
person.11 However, it goes much further
than this; the government took the
opportunity to regulate the use and
storage of tissue acquired from living as
well as deceased persons, the ‘trafficking’
of certain bodily materials, and non-
consensual DNA analysis. 
The medical research community
vigorously resisted several of the
government’s proposals, but not all of their
criticisms were heeded. In the end, the
pivotal rule for biomedical research is that
a researcher must have the individual’s
consent before using or storing tissue
obtained from a living adult for medical
research, and before analysing the DNA
within the tissue. An exception applies if a
research ethics committee (REC) has
approved the study, the researcher is not
able to identify the individual and is not
likely to be able to identify them in the
future.
The requirements for valid consent—which
is called appropriate consent in the case
of use and storage of tissue and
‘qualifying consent’ for situations where
DNA is analysed—are not set out in the
legislation. This is left to the common law
and guidance from the Human Tissue
Authority (HTA, a regulatory authority set
up under the Act). Failure to obtain
appropriate consent before using or
storing tissue for medical research is an
unlawful act that is punishable as a
criminal offence subject to three years’
imprisonment, a fine, or both. Strangely,
the Act does not impose civil liability, which
would give the wronged individual the right
to compensation. Whilst consent is
needed for research, it is not required for
public health monitoring, clinical audit,
quality assurance, performance
assessment or medical training. The
government took the (contentious) view
that research is categorically different and
not intrinsically related to medical
treatment or the maintenance of public
health. The soundness of this view was
disputed during the passage of the Bill
through Parliament, with critics pointing to
the importance of research for evidence-
based medicine and the blurred
6
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8 Chief Medical Officer, Report of a Census of Organs and Tissues Retained by Pathology Services in England, The Stationery Office,
2001; Mavis McLean, Letting Go… Parents, Professionals and the Law in the Retention of Human Material after Post Mortem, in
Andrew Bainham, Shelley Day Sclater, Martin Richards (ed.), Body Lore and Laws, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002: 79-89; Bristol Royal
Infirmary Interim Report, Removal and retention of human material, para. 64.
9 Margaret Brazier, Organ retention and return: problems of consent, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2003, 29: 30-33.
10 Expected to commence in 2006.
11 Rules applying after a Coroner’s post mortem will be dealt with under a revised Coroners Rules.
distinctions between research, clinical
audit, quality assurance and performance
monitoring.
The underlying philosophy of the original
Bill was somewhat reminiscent of Graeme
Laurie’s concept of spatial privacy, which
we discuss later in Section 2, and the
broad concept of privacy defined by
Beyleveld et al12. Lawmakers brought
forward a proposal based on the idea that
people have a tight moral and emotional
connection with their tissue even after it is
removed from their body and even when
they cannot be identified from it; and as
such, it ought to be unlawful to use their
tissue without their authorisation. Medical
researchers, particularly pathologists,
argued that it is not practical for them to
obtain appropriate consent. For clinical
geneticists, the Bill would have prohibited
them from analysing DNA to assist a
relative in the absence of consent from the
original individual. Both groups were
aghast that they stood to be found guilty of
a criminal offence if they slipped up. Lord
May was quoted as saying the proposals
were ‘like using a sledgehammer to crack
a nut’.13
1.2 The Parliamentary debate
More detail, and a sense of the
background issues, can be gained from
the Parliamentary debates on the Bill,
especially those in the Lords. These bring
out the government’s spirited and
sometimes perplexing defence of an
individual’s right to privacy regarding
analysis and use of their tissue, cells and
DNA. They also explain why clinicians and
researchers have become increasingly
concerned that the public interest in
medical research and genetic testing for a
family member’s benefit is being
overlooked, or not given sufficient weight.
Discussion of these issues helps to
develop an understanding of current
government and Parliamentary thinking
relevant to the research and genetic
communities.
For the government, Lord Warner set out
the background to the Human Tissue Bill
during the first House of Lords debate in
the following terms:
‘the Bill is brought forward as a response
to the scandals revealed by the Alder Hey
and Bristol inquiries. There can be no
doubt that many people suffered when
they discovered that the organs of their
loved ones had been kept without their
knowledge. We must not underestimate
the pain endured by those who came to
realise—often many years later—that the
body of the child, husband or mother
whom they had buried was incomplete.
We must ensure that that does not happen
again, and this legislation is key to
ensuring just that. However, it does much
more than that. This Bill will provide the
comprehensive statutory framework
needed to ensure the appropriate use of
human organs and tissue. It will make
consent the clear controlling mechanism
for the retention and use of organs and
tissue and it will establish a regulatory
body to oversee a range of related activity
in this area such as post-mortems, tissue
banking and the public display of human
bodies.’14
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12 http://www.privireal.org
13 Pincock, S., Human Tissue Bill could jeopardise research, scientists warn, British Medical Journal, 2004, 328: 1034.
14 Lords Hansard, 22 July 2004, column 366.
In this section we focus on two areas:
research, and analysis of tissue to benefit
a relative. This brings out the background
assumptions relevant to the concrete
proposals and changes, and the general
tone of the debates.
1.2.1 Research
The original Bill proposed that all research
required consent. However, before
entering the Lords, changes were made
and clarifications given in response to
severe criticism from what Lord Warner
later called the ‘medical-scientific
establishment’:
‘Following extensive discussion with a
range of medical research interests,
including many eminent people in that
sphere, amendments were also made in
another place to provide for the use,
without consent, of residual tissue from
living patients in research, provided that
the tissue is effectively anonymised and
the research approved by a research
ethics committee.’15
The HT Act lists, in Schedule 1, Part 1,
purposes requiring consent. Included in
the list is: ‘6. Research in connection with
disorders, or the functioning, of the human
body.’ This is an extension and elucidation
of general principles outlined at the very
beginning of the Act, in Part 1. However, in
Part 1 of the Act we also find that sub-
sections 1(7)-(9) provide:
‘(7) Subsection (1)(d) does not apply to
the storage of relevant material for use for
the purpose of research in connection with
disorders, or the functioning, of the human
body if- 
(a) the material has come from the body of
a living person, and 
(b) the research falls within subsection (9). 
(8) Subsection (1)(f) does not apply to the
use of relevant material for the purpose of
research in connection with disorders, or
the functioning, of the human body if- 
(a) the material has come from the body of
a living person, and 
(b) the research falls within subsection (9). 
(9) Research falls within this subsection if- 
(a) it is ethically approved in accordance
with regulations made by the Secretary of
State, and 
(b) it is to be, or is, carried out in
circumstances such that the person
carrying it out is not in possession, and not
likely to come into possession, of
information from which the person from
whose body the material has come can be
identified.’
A similar couplet—stating the general
principle of consent then excluding
anonymised samples—governs genetic
analysis (Part 3, 45 & Schedule 4, Part 2:
10). Uncertainty remains as to the
circumstances in which it is expected that
consent should be sought rather than
relying on anonymisation. Lord Warner’s
statement in the first Lords debate—on the
possibility of research without consent
using anonymised samples—was
repeated several times by the government
in response to probing by Peers. However,
save reiterating that RECs would consider
the issue, statements in the debates on
this question always contained an element
of ambiguity as to the circumstances in
8
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15 Lords Hansard, 22 July 2004, columns 369-70.
which consent should be sought.16
Having made the concession prior to
debate in the Lords to allow research on
anonymised samples without consent, the
government refused to move any further,
sticking to the principle that research could
only take place if there was consent or
anonymisation (or both). At every
opportunity, amendments were presented
to make possible, in defined
circumstances, the confidential handling of
identifiable tissue in research when
consent might be absent or unclear. These
were firmly rejected. The following quote
taken from Lord Warner’s response during
the Grand Committee stage of the House
of Lords debate gives some background to
the government’s thinking:
‘As a number of Members of the
Committee have said, the amendment
seeks to remove the requirement for
anonymisation of residual tissue when it is
used without consent and with ethical
approval… As I set off along the path of
arguing against the amendment, I am very
conscious that I shall probably be told later
how cautious I am being by the noble
Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. However, I
have something to say gently to him. In
one of his rhetorical flights, he said that
there was a huge barrier to consent.
However, there is quite a simple solution—
it is called asking the patient, and I shall
come back to it in a while…
…There is also some misunderstanding
about the issue of confidentiality. The
requirement in the Bill that the researcher
should not know the identity of the patient
if he or she is using the tissue without the
patient’s consent is really about fairness
and balance. If the researcher is to use
tissue without the consent or knowledge of
the person from whom it came, then in
fairness he should not know the identity of
that person. It is inappropriate for doctors
or researchers to be in a position where
they hold tissue and names, and
potentially discover relevant new clinical
information through a research project,
when the patient has no knowledge that
research might be conducted using their
tissue. 
That is the principle we are seeking to
enforce in this legislation. We believe that
researchers need to respect it as part of—
I repeat—the balance that the Bill seeks to
strike in what has been an extremely
contentious area. 
Furthermore, this provision is in keeping
with the data protection principles which
require patients to be provided with
information on the uses to which data they
provide will be put. It also reflects the
principles identified by the Patient
Information Advisory Group, as the noble
Earl, Lord Howe, said in an earlier debate,
which include the “ask or anonymise”
principle.’17
PIAG does indeed promote the ‘ask or
anonymise’ principle. However, there is
9
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16 In Grand Committee, Lord Warner said: ‘if the researcher really needs to know the identity of the patient in order to access his
identifiable clinical records, for example, he should ask for the patient’s consent. We accept that there is a need for linkage, and we
have done nothing in the Bill to prevent linkage. It would be surprising if ethical committees did not require a researcher to ask for
consent in these circumstances, and a number of noble Lords have hinted that they believe that that would be the case.’ (Lords
Hansard, 15 September 2004, column 426). In the final Lords debate he said: ‘Most typically, if consent has not been sought or given,
then REC-approved research with anonymisation will be the norm.’ (Lords Hansard, 03 November 2004, column 404).
17 Lords Hansard, 15 September 2004, columns 425-6.
(currently at least) the possibility of using
identifiable data without consent. We
return to examine the analogy with data
protection rules in Section 5.18
One further comparison between the use
of data and tissue made by government in
debate bears recording: although
organisations are, subject to ethical
approval, allowed to process anonymised
patient data without consent, this should
not, according to PIAG, override a refusal
of consent. During the Grand Committee
stage in the Lords on the Human Tissue
Bill, an amendment was tabled that would
have placed such a restriction on the use
of tissue into the Act itself. The
government agreed with the principle, but
resisted the amendment. The reasons
presented by Lord Warner bring out further
some of the underlying thinking on the
working of consent under the Act:
‘I would not wish to give the impression
that the government think that the views of
patients should be ignored. On the
contrary, we wish to enlist the support of
patients in medical research for the good
of us all. That is why we have made a
requirement for consent the default
position for using tissue for research.
Ministers have made it quite clear that,
notwithstanding the fact that it may be
lawful to use it without consent if it is
anonymised, if an individual particularly
does not wish his tissue to be used in
research, then it would not be good
practice to do so. We would not expect
tissue to be used in those circumstances.
Code of practice guidance on this will be
issued by the Human Tissue Authority and
tissue storage facilities and their records
will be licensed and inspected accordingly.
However, the practical effect of the
amendment would be to bring about a
situation whereby patients may have to be
invited to give or withhold their consent. It
would also entail an onerous process of
having to check the records of all patients
from whom potential research samples
have come, in case they had withheld
consent. That would be a considerable
bureaucratic problem. I am sure that it is
not what the noble Lord had in mind when
he tabled this amendment, but I would ask
him to reconsider the position in the light
of what I have said because I think that it
will add to the concerns and demands on
the medical research community.’19
1.2.2 Analysis of tissue to benefit a
relative
We now consider the second issue
highlighted earlier: analysis of tissue to
benefit a relative. As with the rules
governing research, the government’s
position softened as the Bill passed
through its various Parliamentary stages.
But once more a line was drawn beyond
which no further changes were
entertained.
Initially, explicit consent was required from
the proband (the initial or index case in the
genetic investigation of a family) for their
tissue to be analysed for the benefit of a
relative. The problems this would present
in those cases where contact had been
lost with such a person, or when they
10
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18 A similar role to that played by PIAG for England and Wales, is that carried out by the Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland
which was set up to provide advice to NHS Scotland and the General Register Office of Scotland on the release of patient-identifiable
data for research purposes.
19 Lords Hansard, 15 September 2004, column GC419.
refused to answer requests, led the
government to propose a mechanism for
making applications to the court, which
might deem consent to be given. This was
later amended so that the HTA had
powers to consider these applications
instead of the courts. However, the
government rejected the proposal to allow
the use of tissue for the benefit of another
individual against a refusal. Under the HT
Act, such a refusal cannot be examined or
challenged, whether or not a living
individual can be contacted to discuss it
further. Such a refusal holds absolutely
even if the individual is now dead.20
The case made by professional and
genetic patient groups began from the
common practice of analysing samples
from a family in order to give the most
accurate diagnosis possible to the
individual. Two related examples circulated
to Peers were assessing risk for familial
breast cancer and hereditary non-
polyposis colon cancer. The significance of
a genetic variation for an individual can, in
some cases, only be assessed by
determining whether an affected relative
carries the same mutation, and through
studying the cancerous cells of that
person.
Whilst it was agreed that the need to
consider acting against a refusal would
arise infrequently—the vast majority of
patients consent to help family members—
it was generally acknowledged that
problems did arise occasionally. However,
amendments to create a mechanism to
allow the courts to consider the competing
interests at stake in such cases were
roundly rejected by government. Speaking
in the Grand Committee, Baroness
Andrews was emphatic: 
‘Without wanting to use language that is
too emotive, I should say that the
amendment, though sincerely meant,
would drive a stake through the heart of
the Bill because it goes against its basic
principle; namely, that people should be
able to decide what happens to their
bodily material.’21
Pressed to justify such a resounding
rejection of the interests of others, the
government, in this debate and others
(and also in a letter to Peers), developed
the argument that people have an interest
in their tissue, in this context at least, that
is similar in strength to a right to prevent
battery. The analysis of tissue retained in a
laboratory against consent was compared
with forcing someone to submit to medical
examination,22 and support was claimed
from court judgements that have upheld
the right of the individual to refuse medical
treatment, however irrational others might
11
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20 We should declare an interest in this. On behalf of the Genetic Interest Group John Gillott lobbied the Lords on this question, while
Kathy Liddell helped to prepare briefings with members of the Cambridge Genetics Knowledge Park.
21 Lords Hansard, 15 September 2004, column 480.
22 Lords Hansard, 15 September 2004, column 482.
consider that choice to be.23
We have highlighted research and the
analysis of tissue to benefit a relative
because it is around these issues that the
HT Act has indicated the direction of travel
most clearly. As the quote from Lord
Warner given at the beginning of this
section indicates, on these questions the
government had the perspective that
consent should be the ‘clear controlling
mechanism’. For better or worse, some
clarity has undoubtedly been created on
the question of analysing tissue to benefit
a relative24, but more needs to be said
regarding research, especially about
consent—on the ambiguities inherent in
the idea, and on the political background
to the contemporary debate.
1.3 The researcher’s dilemma
For the government Lord Warner, in the
first Lords debate, upheld the validity of
generic and enduring consent in the
following terms:
‘The Bill does not set out the form consent
should take in any particular situation. Let
me state clearly that the Bill does not
require consent to be specific to each
research project for which tissue might be
used. Consent can be broad. Consent to
research can be generic and enduring.’25
This same point had been made by the
government in the Commons debate and
was repeated several times subsequently.
In the Lords debate at Report stage,
Baroness Onora O’Neill, along with many
other knowledgeable members of the
Lords, welcomed such Ministerial
comments. She supported (unsuccessful)
attempts to have this inserted into the Bill.
Earl Howe explained why researchers
were keen to see the statements written
into law:
‘….many scientists in the research
community are anxious to ensure that
some kind of generic and enduring
consent will be legal when the Bill
becomes law. 
At Second Reading, the Minister gave
reassurances on that point. However,
worries persist. They persist principally
because of the requirement for specificity
of consent laid down by many research
ethics committees. They also stem from
the fact that the Bill is silent on the whole
matter. If we are serious about the need to
maintain the momentum of medical
12
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23 Lords Hansard, 3 November 2004, column 419. The court judgement thought to have the most force was Re MB, in which Lady
Justice Butler-Sloss said that: ‘a competent woman, who has the capacity to decide, may, for religious reasons, other reasons, for
rational or irrational reasons or for no reason at all, choose not to have medical intervention, even though the consequence may be
the death or serious handicap of the child she bears, or her own death. In that event the courts do not have the jurisdiction to declare
medical intervention lawful.’ The government acknowledged that the cases were far from identical, but we would suggest that it was an
exceedingly long stretch to compare a case that examined the mother’s rights (where third parties propose surgical intervention)
against those claimed for an unborn fetus, with cases which require a balance to be drawn between the rights of an adult (where third
parties propose to use information or tissue) and another adult.
24 This point requires a caveat, which will be discussed in more detail later in this section. The Act covers the analysis of tissue
(containing cellular material), including the analysis of DNA contained within tissue. It does not cover DNA extracted from tissue. From
the strong statements made by Baroness Andrews and other members of the government, it might seem reasonable to assume that
the intention was to forbid analysis of DNA to help a relative in the face of a refusal in all circumstances. However, there is evidence to
suggest that despite such public statements, the government knew of this loophole when it crafted the legislation.
25 Lords Hansard, 22 July 2004, columns 369-70.
research in this country, and about
imposing on it the least possible
administrative burden, there is a case for
ensuring on the face of the Bill that
obtaining generic and enduring consent
will be one option open to medical
researchers when presenting their
proposals to research ethics committees
for approval. A signal of that kind would be
important for the HTA.’26
This illustrates the sometimes perplexing
character of the regulatory regime facing
researchers at the moment. The
government argues that generic and
enduring consent is valid. The government
also states that they cannot second-guess
the decisions of Research Ethics
Committees (RECs), to whom they are
looking to make the decisions in practice.
At the same time RECs often insist on
specific and time-limited consent. They in
turn look for guidance, but receive little
from the government beyond general
statements. Researchers find themselves
caught in the middle, and increasingly feel
themselves to be knocked from pillar to
post.27
In addition to pressing for amendments to
legitimise generic and enduring consent,
Baroness O’Neill and Earl Howe also
pressed the government to accept
amendments that would have allowed
research using identifiable tissue without
consent subject to appropriate ethical
approval.
The attempt to amend the Bill in ways that
might appear to be contradictory—
reinforcing the legitimacy of general
consent and simultaneously seeking a
mechanism for the confidential handling of
identifiable tissue without consent—further
illustrates the complexity of the issue. At
the heart of the problem is the tension
between the pressures of clinical practice
and the complexity and open-ended
character of research on the one hand,
and the ideal of express and informed
consent on the other. No matter how often
the government states that generic
consent is valid, the concern remains that
in specific circumstances it might be
thought insufficient.
The response of many scientists to the
difficulty of obtaining meaningful informed
and specific consent, and the perceived
deficiencies of general consent, is to seek
to legitimise, or re-legitimise, implicit
consent, or else to advocate a public
interest defence to the use of identifiable
material without consent. This reflects a
pragmatic concern that only in this way
can they be sure that their actions are
ethically and legally permissible. More
positively, it also expresses a belief that
beyond the formal aspect of general
consent, the real content remains a
confidential relationship between patient
and scientist, based on trust that scientists
are behaving ethically and in the public
interest. Part of that trust is an
understanding that scientists will handle
sensitive information and tissue in
13
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26 Lords Hansard, 15 September 2004, column GC 517.
27 At the time of writing, the Regulations to be made under the HT Act and the Codes of Practice for the HTA had not been finalised.
However, drafts issued for consultation did, implicitly, grant a greater validity to specific over general consent in that they contained the
proposal that a researcher did not need a licence to store tissue if this was for a specific research project with specific consent, but did
need a licence if a general consent had been given to enable the material to be stored and used for future projects. Our own view is
that this distinction is misguided both in the specific situation of licensing under the HT Act, and as a general principle. General
consent can be just as valid as specific consent. The important thing is that it be informed.
confidence. Approaching the issue from
the perspective of anonymisation,
scientists wonder why they should invest a
lot of time and effort, and maybe lose
important information in the process, for
little gain, when a system of qualified
confidentiality has served them and the
public well for many years.
1.4 The politics of the HT Act
This brings us to the politics of the HT Act.
Lord Warner, at Report stage in the House
of Lords debate, stated: 
‘I know that the use of residual samples is
not the same as what happened at Alder
Hey. But, first, it was not just at Alder Hey,
as we saw from Bristol and the Isaacs
report. Unconsented removal and the use
of tissue and organs was widespread. But
the impact of the whole episode went far
wider. It has affected the use of tissue in
research, as we have seen, since
pathology laboratories, RECs and tissue
banks have been uncertain about whether
and when they can release samples.
Under the Bill, this will become clear and
confidence can return. But that must be
accompanied by a change in the way in
which some parts of the research and
clinical professions regard these
questions. It is not just a question of post-
mortem tissue, but of all elements of
professional medical and research
practice. To say, “Trust me because I am a
doctor”, is not good enough in today’s
world.’28
Lord Jenkin undoubtedly spoke for many,
inside and outside the chamber, when he
disagreed with Lord Warner’s presentation
of the background to the Bill:
‘When the reports [into Bristol and Alder
Hey] were published and the matter
became a matter of public comment, the
then Ministers at the Department of
Health, by using some very unrestrained
language, managed to turn the whole
affair into a national horror story. I believe
that this was quite unnecessary. I also
believe that events subsequent to that
have been coloured by those comments.
The first comment on the report by the
right honourable Alan Milburn, the then
Secretary of State for Health, was that it
was “gruesome”. One wonders whether he
had the slightest idea of what happens in
a post-mortem examination. Perhaps
modern television programmes could have
shown him. The fact is that this got off on
the wrong foot from the beginning. 
I do not doubt that many of the relatives,
particularly of children who had died and
whose tissues had been removed and
retained without consent, were very
distressed indeed to learn what had
happened. I believe that in their distraught
reactions, as graphically recorded in the
Kennedy and Redfern reports and also in
the minutes of the Chief Medical Officer’s
summit meeting held on 11 January 2001,
these people deserve our profound
sympathy. There is no doubt that they
suffered grievously.
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28 Lords Hansard, 25 October 2004, column 1072. Of course, measures to curtail or remove the autonomy previously enjoyed by the
medical profession predate Alder Hey and Bristol, as does the argument that such measures are necessary because the old adage
‘Trust me because I am a doctor’ is inadequate in today’s accountability-conscious world. For a (partially sympathetic) analysis of how
this attitude is embedded in the Health Act 1999 see A. C. L. Davies, Don’t Trust Me, I’m a Doctor, Medical Regulation and the 1999
NHS Reforms, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2000, 20(3): 437-456.
Equally, I have little doubt that it was
Ministers’ desire to fall over backwards to
respond to that distress that led to the Bill,
as originally introduced, to being seriously
out of balance.’29
During Grand Committee in the Lords,
Lord Jenkin put the matter in stronger
terms: 
‘For a former Minister of Health [Alan
Milburn, at the time] to describe it as the
worst disaster that ever happened to the
National Health Service seems to me to
be a most extraordinary statement. It
should never have been made because it
is not that at all.’30
In today’s world of research there is much
to be gained by linking multiple data and
tissue collections. Anonymisation is
possible, but to link the different sets,
someone needs to be able to return the
data and samples to a non-anonymised
form, even if only temporarily. The idea
that ‘Trusted Third Parties’, perhaps
collected together as a formal or quasi-
government agency, should handle the
necessary anonymisation and de-
anonymisation required carries with it the
obvious message that such parties are
trust-worthier than researchers.
This message reinforced the irritation, and
even hostility, of many scientists.31 In
debate Lord Winston made the pointed
observation that: ‘People are more worried
about political statements and about those
scientists who advise government. There
is a deep mistrust of politicians rather than
a mistrust of the medical profession. As
every review reports, scientists and
doctors are much more trusted than
politicians. Noble Lords ought to bear that
in mind when we consider these matters
and seek to put them in some kind of
focus.’32 It would be interesting to know
what the public would make of, for
example, what would amount to a
government run, centralised system of
non-consented anonymisation and de-
anonymisation of tissue and data
collections, if this were to emerge, in
contrast to a system in which
professionals shared data confidentially on
a localised basis.33
In summary, the idea that individuals, even
knowledgeable ones, have the
background information, time or inclination
to give detailed consent to the range of
possible future uses of their tissue is
widely recognised to be seriously flawed.
And yet, as an ideal or an aspiration (with
unclear legal aspects), it is also widely
upheld. The role of RECs in relation to
anonymised tissue (and data), or the
proposed role of representative research
participants when a general consent has
been sought and given, can be seen as a
response to the gap between rhetoric or
aspiration and reality. Existing regulatory
frameworks and proposals are also
premised upon something else, however:
a lack of trust, or a perceived general loss
of trust, in clinicians and researchers, who
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29 Lords Hansard, 22 July 2004, columns 389-90. 
30 Lords Hansard, 15 September 2004, column 456.
31 Of a piece with the messages transmitted by the Act is the fact that the Bill was introduced into Parliament without, contrary to what
was anticipated, a draft being circulated to professional bodies for comment and discussion.
32 Lords Hansard, 22 July 2004, column 385.
33 In what must be the acknowledged to be a highly self-selecting group, John Gillott found that when it was put like this, all
(approximately 30) participants at a workshop at the Genetic Interest Group’s 2004 AGM preferred confidential exchange of
information between professionals to the suggested alternative.
in the past had greater latitude to use their
own judgement to fill the inevitable gap
between public and specialist knowledge
and interest. This constellation of legal,
sociological and political factors underpins
contemporary confusion and
dissatisfaction.
1.5 Privacy after the HT Act
Where does the HT Act leave the issue of
privacy? Informational privacy is, to a first
approximation, strengthened, in that
research using identifiable samples will
need consent. However, this needs to be
qualified by considering the fact that
linkage of anonymised samples with
medical records will be possible and,
crucially, de-anonymisation and linkage to
other tissue or data collections will also be
possible. It might be more accurate to say
that the right to informational privacy will
be upheld against scientists but not
‘trusted third parties’—the individuals and
bodies entrusted with the initial
anonymisation process and the
subsequent de-anonymisation needed to
link sets of data and / or tissue.
The precise degree to which spatial
privacy is protected in the context of
medical research is unclear. A spatial
privacy right embodies the idea that an
individual should be able veto some or all
uses of their tissue or health information,
whether or not it is identified as originating
from them as a named individual or is
anonymised in some way. As we have
shown, the government rejected an
amendment that would have made it illegal
to use anonymised tissue in research if a
patient had expressly refused to give
consent to this. In the Act itself, no
distinction is drawn between absence of
consent and refusal to give consent in the
clauses governing research using
anonymised tissue, but the government
stated that if an individual particularly does
not wish his tissue to be used in research,
then it would not be good practice to do
so. This point remains a little unclear.
However, it might be that even if licensing
arrangements enforce a distinction, it
would require an individual to be aware of
the subtleties involved and to be motivated
enough to force the issue for the
distinction to become meaningful,
especially if anonymised samples are
used and consent therefore is not
sought.34
By establishing that a clinician must ask
for consent before using tissue to benefit a
relative, and stating clearly that it is illegal
to use the tissue in the face of a refusal,
the Act strengthens a spatial privacy claim
within the family (clearly, in this context,
the analysis cannot be performed
meaningfully on an anonymised sample).
There is, however, an important caveat to
this that has not been widely commented
on. The Act as a whole covers tissue
containing cells, and the DNA offence in
particular covers the analysis of DNA
within a cell or the holding of material
containing cells with the intention of
analysing DNA contained within; but it
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34 Our purpose in highlighting the limitations placed upon a spatial privacy right in the research context is not to suggest that such a
right should be enacted or strengthened. In fact, our own preference would be for a clearer, more transparent system in which the
limitations placed on privacy claims were honestly acknowledged and reasons given for such limitations. We consider interferences in
spatial privacy to be a relatively minor incursion and one that would almost always amount to a necessary and proportionate
interference where the motivation was medical research.
explicitly does not cover analysis of what
is often called Extracted DNA. Extracted
DNA, as the name suggests, is DNA that
has been extracted from a cell and stored
in a form that is stable in a non-cellular
environment. Within clinical genetics it is
becoming routine to store DNA in this
form, and there is a trend to do the same
in other areas of specialist practice.
Clearly, the provisions of the Act will cover
the material before the DNA is extracted
and indeed the extraction process itself.
However, in the clinical context these
actions will be covered by the consent
given during the initial clinical encounter
for the original clinical purposes.
The Human Genetics Commission, in its
report Inside Information (2002),
recommended that the government create
a criminal offence of the non-consensual
or deceitful obtaining and/or analysis of
personal genetic information. This was put
forward primarily in response to the idea
that people might try to establish, for
example, paternity in the case of well-
known individuals by surreptitiously
collecting cellular material from discarded
items (such as a toothbrush or a beer
glass).
One reading of the relevant clauses in the
Act is that the government has acted upon
this concern in crafting a law that makes
this kind of activity illegal, while allowing
clinical genetics in particular to use and
store DNA in a manner which falls outside
the Act. This may be true, and there is
evidence that professionals are operating
on the assumption that it is true.35 It does
however run counter to public statements
by government about the spirit and
ideology of the Act in Parliamentary
debates. In recommending its Bill to
Parliament and the public, the government
repeatedly emphasised the importance of
upholding the individual’s right to refuse
that their tissue be used by medical
professionals, as well as in non-medical
contexts.
Whether this legislative sleight of hand will
form the basis of a significant exception or
simply a curiosity of drafting will depend
on the extent to which DNA is stored in a
non-cellular form, and whether medical
professionals are comfortable conducting
non-consensual analysis of tissue on the
imprimatur of a legislative technicality.
Certainly, civil servants have sought to
reassure medical professionals that it
would indeed be lawful to analyse DNA
without consent in certain circumstances if
they use Extracted DNA. It thus seems
that the loophole will be significant.
2 Legal Policy and Proposals for
Research Using Data
We have shown that, in drafting the
Human Tissue Bill in the way that it did,
the government wanted to strengthen
individual privacy rights, and that it has
achieved this to some degree in the Act. A
number of influential academics and
writers recommend a similar regime for the
handling of data; a structure that they
believe is, or might be, consistent with a
number of international legal and policy
instruments.
17
HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIVACY AND MEDICAL RESEARCH
35 See Joint Committee on Medical Genetics, Consent and confidentiality in genetic practice: guidance on genetic testing and sharing
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In considering views on the legal
standards relevant to and interpretations
given to the principles of confidentiality,
data protection and privacy, a useful
starting point is an article by Jean McHale,
Professor of Law, University of Leicester36,
in which she argues that overlapping legal
problems are rife. Her focus is genetic
databases, but many of her points have
broader relevance. There is, she argues,
some uncertainty surrounding the legality
of various research practices. In particular,
rights-based European and international
statements emphasise free and informed
consent for the taking and analysis of
genetic material, and it is far from clear
that this is always gained in practice,
depending on how the term ‘informed’ is
interpreted, and on whether it is accepted
that anonymisation removes the need for
detailed consent to future uses.
To elaborate briefly on McHale’s concerns
about informed consent and
anonymisation: a common response to the
difficulty of obtaining consent to many
possible specific uses of samples and data
is to seek a generic or general consent.
Additionally, the giving of generic consent
is often viewed as expressing a wider
commitment to medical research: ‘Generic
consent may also be seen to cohere with
notions of social solidarity.’37 But for
McHale this merely serves to re-highlight
the significance given to informed and
freely given consent in rights-based
statements and data protection legislation.
Furthermore, related to concerns about
whether it can be truly informed, she
argues that generic or general consent is
flawed, as it relies on a ‘gift’ model that
runs into trouble since it in turn is
connected with ideas of ownership that are
not accepted or acknowledged. McHale
believes that anonymisation can be a
solution, but she doubts it can remove
entirely data protection (and duty of care)
obligations. She is also concerned that
anonymisation is rarely complete
(irreversible); much genetic research and
clinical practice requires linkage of
genotypic and phenotypic data.
It is not our intention to endorse these
legal arguments, but to draw attention to
this significant legal opinion, which
demonstrates why data protection laws are
currently so controversial amongst
bioethicists and scientists. One way of
viewing these proposals is as an argument
for data to be governed by a regime
similar to that governing tissue under the
new Act, or perhaps by a still tighter
regime. Within this framework, further
issues and problems are raised.
2.1 Privacy and anonymisation
The significance of and limitations on
anonymisation are particularly relevant
today. The Icelandic Health Sector
Database was set up by an Act of
Parliament of December 1998 to
investigate the relationship between
genetic and environmental factors in
common diseases. Initially, controversy
centred on the security of data storage
and the ‘opt out’ basis on which the project
was established. This discussion has not
ceased, but more recently a different
aspect has come to the fore, spurred by a
decision of the Icelandic Supreme Court in
2003, which considered whether data
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36 J. V. McHale, Regulating Genetic Databases: Some Legal and Ethical Issues, Medical Law Review, 2004, 12: 70-96.
37 McHale: 82.
could be legally deposited in the database
if it provides identifiable information about
others who have refused consent for their
data to be entered. Related to this are
controversies about the meaning of
anonymisation and its practical limitations
when multiple data sets are linked. While
the detailed character of the Icelandic data
sets combined with the relatively small
size of the Icelandic population have
thrown these issues into sharp relief, these
points are considered by some to be
relevant in other countries. In a number of
articles, in particularly in commentary on
the Supreme Court ruling, Renate Gertz
argues that anonymisation will always be
incomplete:
‘One of the facts that the Icelandic
Supreme Court criticised most harshly
regarding the Health Sector Database was
the fact that through combining three
different databases—the Health Sector
Database consisting of the medical
records, the Book of Icelanders containing
Icelandic genealogy and the genetic
samples database—the database could no
longer be considered anonymous. In fact,
the combination of the three databases
would enable scientists operating the
combined database to identify Icelandic
citizens, as the database would contain all
other information except for names and
addresses, namely marital status,
education, profession, municipality of
residence and age of the person as well
as specific diseases. In fact, in data
protection law, it is stipulated that, if a data
controller has access to several different
databases and an individual can be
identified from linking the information
contained in both, then the relevant
content of each single database is to be
considered personal data. It does not
matter in this connection whether the
information from each individual databank
would not suffice to identify the person.
Also if the information is contained in an
encrypted database, to which the data
controller has the key or is likely to obtain
the key in the future, the information in the
database will be considered personal data.
Directive 95/46 goes even further: if a key
to the encrypted database exists
anywhere in the world, the data controller
is deemed to have access to the key,
however unlikely this event may be,
resulting in encrypted information being
personal data.’38
The legal academic Graeme Laurie makes
a more fundamental criticism of current
practice in one of the few book-length
treatments of genetic privacy. He argues
that: ‘the avoidance of harm is not the only
reason that we respect individual privacy.
We also respect privacy in order to
respect individuals themselves. It is not
clear, however, that this particular goal is
currently being met. It indicates that
something is missing from our perspective
on privacy.’39
For Laurie, this missing privacy right is
captured by the notion of ‘spatial privacy’,
which we touched on in Section 1 above.
Spatial privacy is the interest individuals
have in a certain zone of solitude and
separateness from others, including what
they know and do not know about
themselves, and in the manner in which
information about them is used. In his
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European Journal of Health Law, 2004, 11: 235-6.
39 Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy, Cambridge University Press, 2002: 255.
book, Laurie devotes more attention to the
former question, ‘the right not to know’,
and indeed in the first instance he defines
and develops the notion of spatial privacy
in relation to this: ‘we have examined the
nature of privacy interests that individuals
have in genetic information and identified
those as being of two kinds: informational
privacy interests which concern issues of
security of existing information, and spatial
privacy interests which relate to the
protection of the self from unwarranted
intrusion, including intrusion with
information about one’s own self.’40
However, he develops the point further by
arguing that there should be constraints on
the way information leaves the zone
notwithstanding the possibility that it may
be anonymised. This means that consent
should be sought and given, but more
besides: he argues that consent is an
insufficient reference point for deciding
when information is fairly used or
communicated, in the light of spatial
privacy interests. His concern is that when
information leaves the zone, individuals
are typically asked to give consent on a
one-off basis, which does not enable them
to mediate the ways in which the
information is subsequently used. He
believes that this has contributed to public
distrust of research, which must be
addressed by offering the public and
patients meaningful participation in
research projects: ‘it is precisely because
people feel disenfranchised from, and
disempowered by, the modern machinery
of research that we face the current public
crisis of confidence in research in general
and genetic research in particular.
Individuals who provide samples for
research purposes are not, and do not feel
like, stakeholders in the enterprise.’41 To
give effect to control and participation, he
concludes with the radical suggestion that
a property right in the body may need to
be considered.42
2.2 Automating analysis, scrutinising
scientists and manipulating data
The pressure to move towards the use of
data on the basis of specific consent to all
uses or at least clear consent or strict
anonymisation, set against a background
of real or perceived distrust of scientists in
general, and researchers in particular, has
generated support for several adaptations
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40 Laurie: 243.
41 Laurie: 311.
42 More recently, Laurie has argued: ‘Property is a powerful control device for the bundle of rights that it confers. It also carries a
particular message—one of the potential for commerce and trade; of market advantage and disadvantage. To recognise a “quasi-
property” claim to material is to support a normatively strong connection to that material and, accordingly, to establish a strong,
justiciable legal interest; by the same token, these examples indicate that “full” property rights will only be recognised where there is
little or no prospect of exploitation or other harm, which can include the “harm” of disrespect for the dignity of the human organism. We
see, then, a widespread ambivalence about property in human material. Other devices, such as consent or contract, are often used
instead of property to establish rights and resolve conflicts. Moreover, there is arguably nothing inherently valuable in an appeal to
property itself save when such an appeal can furnish rights or solutions to disputes which escape other legal concepts. It is with just
such a critical eye that we should consider the entire gamut of legal mechanisms that are employed in the medico-legal sphere, from
which, we contend, property should not be excluded without careful consideration of its own utility and limits.’ J. K. Mason and G. T.
Laurie, Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, 2006, para. 15.4.
Our own view is that the public interest in research will overwhelm any residual interests the individual might have in the
data after it has been anonymised. Furthermore the burdens that would be placed on researchers by mechanisms that attempted to
record all individual preferences on the use of anonymised data would be excessive. If the issue is one of controversial research uses
of data, this should be addressed at the level of public debate and policy rather than via individual veto.
to current practice highlighted in this
section.
Computerised systems are being
developed to anonymise data while at the
same time extracting the maximum
amount of information useful to a project.
This includes the ability to extract
information from clinical notes in which
personal and medical information are
mixed freely together. This could be seen
as a mechanism to make ‘ask or
anonymise’ work. Alternatively, it could be
seen as demonstrating that researchers
are going the extra mile in an attempt to
meet the ideal, thus providing a defence in
limited circumstance of the practice of
using identifiable data without clear
consent.
A different if related idea is for scientists to
submit to greater levels of scrutiny and
control through audit mechanisms. This
was the conclusion of a fascinating and
telling Policy Forum piece in Science.
Zhen Lin and colleagues43 at Stanford
pondered the limitations of anonymisation
in the genetic age, and what conclusions
should be drawn from this.
Their starting point was that the growing
amount of anonymised data in numerous
collections available to research scientists,
combining both phenotypic and genotypic
data (that is, data relating to both bodily
and genetic characteristics), can, when
sufficiently rich, be matched to a sample
obtained from an individual. This makes it
possible for the researcher to use the
genetic match (aided by other clues) to
access phenotypic information, which was
originally given on the understanding that
the dataset would be anonymised:
‘Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
contain information that can be used to
identify individuals. If someone has access
to individual genetic data and performs
matches to public SNP data, a small set of
SNPs could lead to successful matching
and identification of the individual. In such
a case, the rest of the genotypic,
phenotypic, and other information linked to
that information in public records would
also become available.’
In the UK it has been suggested that data
(such as date of birth or addresses) in
anonymised sets might be modified
slightly, made deliberately false or less
precise in other words, to make the job of
identification harder. Lin et al considered
the merits of doing something similar with
SNP data, but rejected it, though
regrettably not primarily on the grounds
that it would reduce the quality and
effectiveness of the research:
‘Tension between the desire to protect
privacy and the need to ensure access to
scientific data has led to a search for new
technologies. However, the hurdles may
be greater than had been suspected. For
example, one approach to protecting
privacy is to limit the amount of high
quality data released and randomly to
change a small percentage of SNPs for
each subject in the database. Suppose
that 10% of SNPs are randomly changed
in a sequence of DNA, a fairly major
obfuscation that would not please many
genetic researchers. Our estimates show
that measuring as few as 75 statistically
independent SNPs would define a small
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group that contained the real owners of
the DNA. Disclosure control methods such
as data suppression, data swapping and
adding noise would be unacceptable by
similar arguments.’
This led them to the conclusion that audit
and monitoring is required, something they
plan to implement as a condition of access
to the data they are collecting:
‘Until technological innovations appear,
solutions in policy and regulations must be
found. We are building the
Pharmacogenomics Knowledge Base,
which contains individual genotype data
and associated phenotype information. No
genetic data will be provided unless a user
can demonstrate that he or she is
associated with a bona fide academic,
industrial, or government research unit
and agrees to our usage policies
(including audit of data access). Although
this does not prevent data abuse, it
provides a way to monitor usage.’
The argument that in the genetic age true
anonymisation is impossible is,
analogously, advanced by some
commentators in the UK as a reason for
tightening up the rules governing the use
of anonymised data. What is perplexing
and irritating about this discussion for
many practising scientists is the
assumption that they need to be prevented
from surreptitiously trawling databases to
make links with biological samples they
have access to from, for example, clinical
work. It is a form of organised distrust,
even if it is not always presented as such,
and support for it from some scientists can
only be read as a defensive reaction to a
critical climate.
2.3 Patients’ views
A similar defensiveness lies behind
another proposal that enjoys varying levels
of support within the policy and scientific
community: patient participation in bodies
overseeing research.
Some social scientists feel that the use of
patient information (particularly genetic
information) is an unsettling form of
instrumentalisation and commodification.
Some are perturbed by departures from
fully informed, specific, explicit consent;
others seem to suggest that even when
individuals have given their consent, the
extent of health-data banking and the
motivations that drive it constitute a
worrying affront to human dignity.
Schematically, we can break the argument
down in the following way:
l An argument based on rights (a 
spatial privacy right): individuals
must be allowed to have an 
influence even if their data is 
anonymised. 
l An argument based on rights with a
sociological aspect: there is 
pressure to conform / to participate, 
such that consent is expected. 
Protections need to be put in place 
to counteract this. 
l A sociological argument: people do
not pay attention or consider things 
in detail; therefore the rights and 
wrongs of handling data and tissue 
have to be considered separately 
from the views of individual 
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participants—the family and society 
have an interest. More pejoratively, 
this latter argument is phrased as: 
genetic science and biomedicine 
objectify and commodify life and 
individuals; controls are needed 
because individual participants offer 
limited protection against this.
A recent edited collection, Genetic
Databases: Socio-Ethical Issues in the
Collection and Use of DNA44, provides
some reflections on these themes,
focusing on a range of European
countries. Klaus Hoeyer’s chapter
captures some key features of the real-life
interactions between researchers and
participants in the kinds of studies under
discussion. In the background he identifies
contrasting views of the state—not only
the traditional welfare model, but also a
more recent notion of the ‘facilitating’ state,
which offers choices rather than providing
universal services. In this context,
informed consent gives people a sense of
responsibility for the research conducted,
but it also creates a ‘diffuse arrangement
of donors who can be only semi-
accountable agents. This network of
agents is linked by a notion of public
oversight’.45
As for consent forms—the mechanism
through which informed consent is
supposed to operate—Hoeyer argues that
few people remember or even read them.
This does not mean that people do not
have concerns about genetic research.
However, typically their concerns are
about high level and somewhat nebulous
questions—such as cloning and
eugenics—that are essentially
unconnected to the research in question.
Furthermore, he continues, the ‘they’ who
might do these things are not seen as the
scientists working on the study. The lack of
interest in the details of consent reflects
that fact that most participants choose to
resolve feelings of uncertainty and
ambiguity by placing trust in the medical
authorities they interact with.
The central argument in Jane Kaye’s
chapter is that it is not possible to apply
either informed consent or public interest
exemptions to population collections as a
clear mechanism to ensure that legal and
ethical standards are met. Such
collections, she argues, carry the risk of
harm, especially when multiple (including
genetic) data sources are combined.
Individuals’ moral rights to control the use
of personal information should accordingly
increase over time. Beyond the interests of
the individual, ‘the nature of genetic
information means that there is an
obligation to accommodate the interests of
the family as well as other groups in
society and that of the population as a
whole’.46 For Kaye, informed consent is
the ‘threshold requirement for the use of
identifiable medical data in medical
research practice and the privacy law of
the European Union’47 (specifically
European Directive 95/46/EC), but this
needs to be supplemented with other
mechanisms. One suggestion is to
regularly seek renewed consent from the
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London, 2004.
45 Tutton et al: 102-3.
46 Tutton et al: 131.
47 Tutton et al: 118.
individuals involved. Another is to have
some participants sit on bodies with
decision-making powers regarding
research using the collections.
Hoeyer is undoubtedly right in many of his
sociological observations about the real
world interactions between doctors,
scientists and patients. Kaye’s points
about the wider family and societal
interests at stake are also well made.
However, these observations and points
do not support conclusions regarding
patient participation in governance
arrangements.
Certainly, if the claimed role for
participants is based on what patients
themselves want, some evidence runs in
the opposite direction. Richard Tutton, one
of the editors of Genetic Databases, and a
proponent of greater patient and public
involvement in oversight of research,
recognises in his chapter that the claimed
crisis of patient and public trust in medical
research—a key background
assumption—may not be true, or at least
not so true as is commonly claimed,48
while Helen Busby discusses the fact that
in a fairly typical study participants did not
see genetic data as especially significant.
Indeed, for many, the photographs taken
of a skin condition they had were seen as
far more worrying and invasive. Busby
goes on to make the interesting
observation that the contemporary vogue
for emphasising lay knowledge (which
shares a similar root to the idea that
participant involvement in ‘governance’
arrangements is necessary to address
defects in current practices) has obscured
the problem of participants having unreal
expectations of what research projects will
do for them, which is a product of the
imbalance of expertise in the knowledge
that matters—the science.
It is possible that most participants really
do not share the concerns raised or
indeed have the desire to ‘participate’, a
situation supported by work conducted for
UK Biobank by the School of Health and
Related Research at the University of
Sheffield: ‘individuals who are most likely
to be interested in UK Biobank are more
likely to want individual feedback, consent
just at the start, and for information to
continue to be used after withdrawal (with
or without the DNA being destroyed).’49
Crudely put, they are happy to be passive
and altruistic, but may want information
and feedback at the start.
To generalise and move the focus away
from the particulars of genetic databases,
‘participation’ is a poor mechanism to
register patients’ and the wider public’s
interest in research. Some patients would
like to be involved more, and many would
like some idea of what is being or might
be done with data and tissue. But most
people are simply uninterested in the fine
detail and would like professionals to get
on with the job without troubling them too
much. Unlike some other areas of their
lives, people have little knowledge or
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interest in research use of data or tissue
and would not appreciate what
participation might mean. The desired
relationship is far better characterised as
one based on trust in professionals to use
data and tissue for research purposes in
an ethically sound manner.50
3 The Law Governing Use of
Patient Data
In this section we show that some or
indeed many of the policy proposals
discussed in Section 2, while often
presented as established legal principles,
have in fact run ahead of, or are really
attempts to develop, the law on data
protection. This is not (solely) an academic
question. One of the biggest problems of
the present governance system is the
uneven weight given to commentary
surrounding the importance of individual
privacy relative to its limits. The
government, civil servants, regulators,
professional guidelines and academic
commentators repeatedly emphasise the
importance of confidentiality, privacy and
consent. In contrast, they give very little
attention to the importance of medical
research, its similarities with clinical audit
and its connections with evidence-based
care. Nor is much scrutiny given to the
finely balanced exemptions that were
purposively included in data protection
legislation and have been developed by
the courts in common law decisions about
confidentiality. As a result, the regulatory
burdens imposed on research are crudely
interpreted to be more demanding than
the higher courts would likely have held if
the questions had been litigated in court.
These burdens are severely hampering
scientific investigation, especially
epidemiological research.
A further problem is that strict
interpretation of the right to privacy
protection can be self-reinforcing. If called
upon to decide a dispute, the courts would
ordinarily give deep consideration to
guidelines published by the Department of
Health, the NHS, the Office of the
Information Commissioner, the Patient
Information Advisory Group, the Medical
Research Council, the General Medical
Council or a combination of these. If a
large number of these bodies suggest that
there is a strict requirement to obtain
explicit consent or to anonymise data fully,
judicial assessments of what is
‘reasonable’, ‘unconscionable’,
‘proportionate’ or ‘good practice’ may be
affected.51
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50 Of concern to researchers is that public feeling following the revelations about practices at Alder Hey looms large in much of the
political discussion of these issues (see Section 1 above), and yet in reality little is known, of a comprehensive nature, about public
attitudes towards the use of tissue in research. More is known about attitudes towards research use of data. A study by ScHARR
found that: ‘the public are generally happy for their personal health information to be used when this is in the public interest. People
are concerned about who has access to their information rather than what it is used for. The public are content for information to be
used by NHS staff, although their responsibilities to maintain confidentiality should be made clearer, potentially with a requirement to
sign a contract acknowledging their obligations. Transfer of anonymised data causes least concern, but the use of identifiable data is
acceptable if necessary.’ ScHAAR, Patient Electronic Record: Information and Consent (PERIC); Public attitudes to protection and use
of personal health information, 2002: 6.
Overall, more could and should be done to test the opinions of groups of patients and selected members of the public who
have been informed about research methods and the difficulty of working, in some cases, with anonymised tissue and data or with
tissue and data with appropriate consents.
51 A particularly striking example is the confusion caused by the GMC’s advice on the duties of confidentiality owed by doctors to
patients, issued in 2000. For a discussion of this see Michael P. Coleman, Barry G. Evans and Geraldine Barrett, Confidentiality and
the public interest in medical research—will we ever get it right?, Clinical Medicine, 2003, 3(3): 219-228.
3.1 The Human Rights Act 1998
The laws we discuss below have been
shaped at a semi-constitutional level since
2000 by the Human Rights Act 1998. One
of the human rights protected by the
Human Rights Act 1998 is, adopting the
language of the European Convention on
Human Rights, the person’s ‘right to
respect for private and family life... home
and ... correspondence’. As with many of
the other rights in the Act, the right to
private life is not absolute; interference is
permitted where it is ‘necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of
others’.52 While the language may appear
straightforward, significant complexities
exist. The scope of the exception is vague
and left open to interpretation. It is well
accepted that the scope of the right
applies to confidential and sensitive
information (which helped fuel the Data
Protection Act 1998), but questions have
been raised as to whether it applies to
human tissue excised from the body, or to
anonymised information. Other rights that
impact on biotechnology are the rights to
life and liberty, and the prohibitions against
torture, slavery and discrimination. The
right to freedom of expression might also
be highly pertinent for researchers if it is
held to encompass a right to impart and
receive scientific knowledge. In addition,
there has been some degree of debate
about who is accountable for respecting
the rights of whom. In particular does the
Human Rights Act 1998 give citizens rights
that they can enforce against other private
persons, or merely against the State and
other public authorities?
We discuss the likely impact of the Human
Rights Act 1998 further in Section 4. But
whatever ambiguities and difficulties of
interpretation it has given rise to, there is
no doubt that the legal framework
governing the use of data, including use of
identifiable data without clear consent,
allows a balance to be struck between
privacy and other interests, including those
of relatives and the wider public. Nor is
there any doubt that the Human Rights Act
1998 reinforces the possibility of striking
such a balance. We make some
suggestions below (Section 3.3) on the
factors that might be involved in this
process.
3.2 The Data Protection Act 1998
Although relatively recent, the Data
Protection Act 1998 has already
dramatically influenced the acquisition,
processing and sharing of health
information for medical research and other
purposes. The central demand of the Act
is that personal data must be processed in
accordance with eight data protection
principles, if the data relate to an individual
who can be identified from that data or
from that data and other information which
is in the possession of, or likely to come
into the possession of, the data controller. 
A key consideration is to determine
whether information used by a researcher
constitutes ‘personal data’. The Court of
Appeal recently gave this term a narrow
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definition in Durant v Financial Services
Authority.53 Data that is merely held in
conjunction with an individual’s name or
other information that identifies him does
not necessarily qualify as personal data;
the data must ‘relate to’ the individual,
meaning it affects the person’s privacy. To
elaborate further, the judgement
highlighted two considerations:
‘The first is whether the information is
biographical in a significant sense, that is,
going beyond the recording of the putative
data subject’s involvement in the
matter or an event that has no personal
connotations…. The second is one of
focus. The information should have the
putative data subject as its focus rather
than some other person with whom he
may have been involved or some
transaction or event in which he may have
figured or have had an interest.’54
In the main, health records clearly satisfy
these tests. However, once data has been
extracted from the files and aggregated
with health data from other people, it may
be argued that the data is not ‘personal’,
particularly if the data has been reversibly
anonymised or is compiled and used in a
way that does not affect the individual or
cause them serious damage or distress.
Accordingly, researchers might argue
according to Durant that collations of
research data are not subject to the data
protection principles.55 However it might
not be prudent for them to act on this
argument.56 The safer view for the time
being is that, if the data is sensitive, the
definition of ‘personal data’ in section 1(1)
of the DPA covers reversibly anonymised
data wherever the encryption key is held
by a member of the research team, or
another person under the control of the
same ‘data controller’ (e.g. the same NHS
Trust or University for whom the
researcher works).
The first data protection principle
stipulates that personal data must only be
processed ‘fairly and lawfully’. The data
controller must also meet a condition of
Schedule 2 and 3.57 Where possible the
data controller should ask the data subject
for their explicit consent before processing
their personal data. Where consent has
not been given, it is permissible to process
health data if the processing meets
another relevant condition in Schedule 2
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55 Correspondence from Dr Chris Pounder, editor of Data Protection and Privacy Practice (23/01/06).
56 It is unclear how the Information Commissioner will apply the Durant judgement in relation to health information. Guidance on the
Information Commissioner’s website states that provided the information in question can be linked to an identifiable individual,
information about the medical history of an individual is an example of personal data. It is also unclear whether the decision will stand.
Although the House of Lords declined leave to appeal, commentators have criticised the reasoning (see e.g. the special issue of Data
Protection and Privacy Practice, 2004) and the European Commission has commenced negotiations with the UK government voicing
its concern that UK law now falls short of the protection required by the European Data Protection Directive (see e.g. http://www.out-
law.com/page-4717). Proceedings might be commenced in the European Court of Justice if the government fails to allay the concerns.
Furthermore, medical research data is usually at some point personal data in the sense of being biographical and focussed on the
individual.
57 There is some dispute whether the requirement under the Act that data is processed ‘fairly and lawfully’ in and of itself requires
compliance with laws external to the Data Protection Act, most notably the law of confidentiality. Our view is that meeting a condition of
Schedule 2 and 3 ensures that data is processed ‘lawfully’ and compliance with Part II of Schedule 1 ensures it is processed ‘fairly’.
Nevertheless laws external to the Data Protection Act apply as separate causes of action. We also take the view that the balance
struck in the common law of confidentiality between the value of privacy and the public interest in medical research is similar in many
ways to that allowed under the Data Protection Act. For a discussion see K. Liddell, The Mythical Connection Between Data Protection
Law and Confidentiality: Processing Data ‘Lawfully’, Bio-science Law Review, 2005, 6(6): 215-222.
and 3. The qualifying conditions are
infamously unclear and the subject of
much debate. One of the most
controversial points is whether a medical
researcher who claims justification from a
condition other than consent is obliged to
notify the data subject that their
information is being used for research
purposes. Some argue that this forms part
of the requirement to process data fairly,
whereas others point out that the
obligation to process data fairly is to make
efforts ‘so far as practicable’ to notify the
individual and that the obligation may be
set aside further if the research fits under
the section 33(2) exemption for statistical
and historical research.58 Our own view is
that the latter interpretation is correct,
provided the conditions of section 33 are
observed. These include that the research
involves a secondary use of data (that is
the research is based on clinical records
and involves no fresh collection of data
from the subject), will not cause
substantial harm or distress, and the data
will not be used to make decisions that
affect the individual. A further condition is
that the information should have been
collected in accordance with the first data
protection principle for another legitimate
purpose (e.g. clinical treatment).
3.3 The law of confidentiality
Personal information of a private or
confidential kind is also regulated by the
common law of confidentiality. Unlike the
Data Protection Act 1998, there is no
special government regulator to monitor
and enforce confidentiality, and there have
been few court cases dealing with health
information or medical research.
Nevertheless the common law has a
significant impact because it influences
guidelines produced by professional
bodies and the Office of the Information
Commissioner, and decisions by RECs.
The effect of the law of confidentiality is
that one must not use or disclose
information that the law considers
confidential, except if authorised by the
person to whom confidentiality is owed, a
provision of statute, the common law
public interest defence, or in accordance
with the procedures established under
section 60 of the Health and Social Care
Act 2001. Confidential information includes
information that is imparted on the
understanding that a special relationship of
confidence exists between the parties, and
information that is obviously private. The
courts have interpreted this to include
information that a reasonable defendant
would realise is confidential, information
which is not generally available or which is
obtained on private property, or which a
reasonable person in the place of the
complainant would consider offensive,
embarrassing or humiliating to disclose.
Unlike actions brought under the Data
Protection Act 1998, a successful
complainant in common law probably has
rights to compensation for emotional
distress as well as physical and
psychological injury and financial loss.
That being said, costs associated with
legal representation would generally deter
plaintiffs who claimed compensation for
emotional distress only.
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58 Section 33 relieves a researcher from the requirements of the second data principle, which ordinarily requires ‘that personal data
shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible
with that purpose or those purposes’. In other words, provided the researcher observes the boundaries of section 33, secondary
historical and statistical research may be carried out as if it was a component of the clinical reason for processing data.
Several elements in the action for breach
of confidence have been the subject of
considerable debate, particularly by
newspaper editors and celebrities. The
most controversial issues in the medical
arena are: 
l ‘does the public interest defence 
stretch to cover medical research?’; 
and 
l ‘is explicit and specific consent 
necessary before a research subject 
can be said to have authorised the 
use of confidential information for 
medical research?’
Although we agree that medical research
activities are not in and of themselves
sufficient to trigger the public interest
defence, in our view the defence applies
to medical research in some situations.
The key determinant is whether a breach
of confidentiality could be said to be a
necessary and proportionate response for
the protection of health. The principle of
proportionality is not an easy one to apply
in practice, particularly as the courts have
not had an opportunity to offer guidance in
the context of medical research. If the
researchers can demonstrate several of
the following points, research without full
anonymisation or consent is more likely to
be considered a proportionate
interference59:
l researchers are dealing with data 
from a large number of data 
subjects;
l a large proportion of data subjects 
are untraceable; 
l there is a serious risk of introducing 
bias that will jeopardise the validity 
of the results or a risk that people 
may be harmed through being 
contacted; 
l there is a serious cost burden in 
seeking consent; 
l the research does not involve direct 
contact with the data subjects (i.e. it 
is secondary research);
l information is anonymised as soon 
as possible and to the extent 
possible; 
l highly sensitive information is 
segregated and not used; 
l people with access to the data have 
signed contracts which subject them 
to discipline or penalty for 
mishandling information; 
l approval is obtained from an 
appropriate research ethics 
committee; 
l the data is protected by strong 
security systems; and 
l strong efforts are made to respect 
the choices of the patients who 
specifically indicate that they do not 
wish their information to be used in 
research. 
3.4 Concluding remarks
In recent years, some of the nuances of
the central principles of data protection
and confidentiality have been overlooked.
This has proven particularly problematic in
the recruitment of research subjects, and
the anonymisation of data. For instance, a
rule of thumb has emerged which holds
that it is unlawful for researchers to
examine patient records in order to select
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59 It is not essential to meet each of these conditions for the public interest defence to apply. The list is indicative. And equally,
meeting all would not guarantee that the public interest defence applies (this depends on the nature of the information and the context
in which it is obtained).
the patients to be contacted about
participation in research. This is
sometimes termed ‘consent to consent’. It
is suggested that the health professional
who first prepared the records (e.g. their
GP) should be engaged for this work.
There is a certain ethical appeal in this
view, but as a matter of practice a GP’s
practice assistant or nurse often carries
out the work. It seems arbitrary that a
practice assistant or nurse should be
entrusted to peruse patient records, yet
researchers are not. It has also been
argued that, strictly speaking, an
individual’s consent is needed before
identifying details are removed from a
patient’s information in preparation for
researchers’ analysis. This might be
termed ‘consent to anonymisation’. This
view is based on a particular reading of
the definition of ‘processing’ and the
ethical assumption that patients have a
legitimate right to choose whether or not
information originally sourced from them
(but subsequently anonymised) is used in
research. To follow this assumption would
be crippling for epidemiological research.
Despite the ambiguities inherent in the
law, the analysis presented above
suggests that the reinforcement of
biomedical privacy is not coming directly
from the Human Rights Act 1998, the Data
Protection Act or indeed the common law
of confidentiality, or at least that it is not
coming directly and primarily from these
sources. The explanation for the privacy-
centric discourse lies, at least in part,
elsewhere. This point is reinforced if we
examine the thinking behind decisions
taken by the courts in these areas, to
which we now turn.
4 Insights from Court
Judgements
To this point, we have sketched the legal
patchwork that governs the use of DNA,
tissue and data, and studied some of the
emphases in recent academic
commentary and human tissue policy. This
section compares and contrasts judicial
views about privacy in recent years with
the attitudes of academics and
policymakers. The comparison cannot be
made directly; judges’ comments are
anchored to existing law, rather than being
statements about ideal positions. Within
these constraints we turn to two sources.
We examine recent decisions for
ideologies of privacy and confidentiality
that can be identified in judicial reasoning.
In addition, we consider what judges have
said about the extent to which the law has
changed since the introduction of the
Human Rights Act 1998. Based on this, we
observe that judges have gradually
strengthened the right to privacy protected
by the law. However, they have been far
less ready than academics and
policymakers to find extended privacy
rights —for example rights of spatial
privacy—or to enforce strictly a right to
privacy where information sharing
advances a competing public interest. 
4.1 Two important cases
The most telling case, and a case to which
we refer to several times below, is Ex p S
and Marper.60 It concerned two
appellants—a boy who was acquitted after
facing trial for an attempted robbery, and
an adult man whose trial for harassment
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was discontinued after he was reconciled
with his partner. These individuals
requested that their DNA samples and
fingerprints, which had been collected and
stored without their consent in accordance
with section 64(1A) of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, be removed
from the National Forensic DNA Database.
The men argued that the statutory power
to retain DNA fingerprints and samples
after acquittal and discontinuation was
contrary to the right to privacy in Article 8
of the Human Rights Act 1998. To
establish their case, the men argued that
the retention of DNA samples and
fingerprints without consent contravened
their right to privacy, and that the
interference was not justified as being
necessary and proportionate in a
democratic society. Four of five House of
Lords judges held that the retention of
DNA did not constitute an interference in
privacy, adding that even if it did, the
interference could be justified as being
proportionate. In their view, the retention
policy enabled the database to expand,
conferring substantial advantages in the
fight against serious crime. They also
noted that the retained information would
not be made public, and a person was not
identifiable to the untutored eye from the
profile on the database. The decision is a
clear indication that senior judges do not
regard genetic information or the right to
control it as a quintessentially private
matter. Although Baroness Hale took a
broader view of the privacy right, deriving
some of her arguments from the Canadian
Privacy Commissioner, she also refused
the appeal. She took the view that while
article 8(1) rights were engaged, the
interference was proportionate under 8(2).
A second indicative case is Campbell v
MGN.61 In this case, the former
supermodel Naomi Campbell claimed
damages for breach of confidence and
compensation under the Data Protection
Act 1998 following the publication of a
photograph of her emerging onto a public
street from a Narcotics Anonymous
meeting. The photograph was
accompanied by text asserting she was a
drug addict, that she was receiving
treatment from NA and detailing the
frequency of her attendance. The
information was surreptitiously acquired
without her consent. Nevertheless
Campbell conceded it was legitimate for
the newspaper to inform the public that
she took drugs, had a serious problem
with addiction and was receiving
treatment. She had previously lied about
this to the public and hence the parties
agreed that the press was entitled to put
the record straight. As a result the case
turned on whether it was legitimate for the
press to disclose the additional
information, in particular the photograph
and the nature and frequency of her
treatment.
Their Lordships accepted that the
additional information included private
information that engaged the Article 8 right
to privacy. However they were more
closely divided about whether the
interference was proportionate given the
importance of free expression in a
democratic society. Two judges62 took the
view that the interference was
comparatively minor relative to the
information that could legitimately be
disclosed to the public, and that some
latitude of journalistic freedom is
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necessary in order to explain news stories
with credibility. They also held that the
photograph added nothing of a private
nature. However, the majority reached a
different view of the balance between the
unauthorised disclosure and the public
interest in free expression. They
concluded that the photograph
represented the fruits of covert
surveillance and hence was a significant
interference, even though the picture was
taken in a public street and did not of itself
reveal embarrassing information. The
majority also held that the additional
information about Campbell’s treatment
was a significant disclosure since it could
affect addicts’ willingness to seek therapy,
and that there were no compelling political
or democratic reasons for the public to
know the details of her treatment.
Although the appeal was ultimately
decided in Campbell’s favour, the decision
illustrates the preparedness of judges to
find a disclosure of health information to
be justified in the light of competing public
interests. All the judges in this case clearly
found it a closely balanced issue.
4.2 Judicial approaches to
confidentiality and privacy
Another point we can draw from the cases
is that judges have different ideas about
the value of privacy and confidentiality.63
This is apparent from the statements the
judges made about whether anodyne
photographs taken by covert surveillance
constitute a breach of privacy and the
manner in which retention of genetic
information was distinguished from its use
and disclosure. Roughly analysed at least
four reasons have been advanced for
protecting privacy and confidentiality.
4.2.1 Privacy and confidentiality
engenders trust
Traditionally the judiciary has protected
confidentiality because it supports
relationships of good faith, and full and
frank disclosure within such relationships.
The relationship between a doctor
providing health care and a patient is a
quintessential example. In several cases,
for example X v Y64 and W v Egdell65, the
judiciary has noted that strong rights to
confidentiality help secure the trust of
patients in their doctors, which means they
do not hesitate to seek treatment when
they need it. X v Y concerned a
newspaper story about doctors who were
believed to be continuing to practice
despite having contracted AIDS. Egdell
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63 A note on ‘confidentiality and privacy’: Ethicists and doctors typically draw a distinction between confidentiality and privacy. The
concept of confidentiality is perceived to protect information imparted within a relationship of trust, ensuring that the information is not
disclosed without authorisation. This is rationalised on the ground that it would jeopardise the future placing of trust. Privacy, on the
other hand, is perceived to have greater connection with an individual’s right to control their personal matters and identity. It is a right
connected with self-determination, separateness from others (particularly the State), autonomy and dignity. Informational privacy,
unlike confidentiality, protects the information from unauthorised use as well as disclosure, and protects the information whether or not
it has been imparted in a relationship of confidence. In the past, this distinction had practical significance because English law
recognised a legal right of confidentiality, but not privacy. Whilst the conceptual distinction can still be made, its practical significance
has been diluted by recent developments in the common law of confidentiality. The law of confidentiality is now recognised as one of
the primary means for giving effect to the right to privacy. The courts’ conflation of privacy and confidentiality has been criticised, but
we copy it here because our purpose is to describe how the courts understand the concepts. 
64 X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648.
65 W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359.
involved a consultant psychiatrist, who
was asked by W’s solicitors to prepare a
report on his mental state ten years after
he had shot seven people, killing five,
throwing hand-made bombs as he did so.
The report was buried after it disapproved
transfer to a less secure regional unit. At
the next periodic review, Dr Egdell
forwarded his report to W’s current
hospital and pushed the medical director
to send a copy to the Home Office. Sir
Stephen Brown of the Court of Appeal said
there is a public interest in maintaining
confidence. Quoting Rose J in X v Y, he
explained:
‘In the long run, preservation of
confidentiality is the only way of securing
public health; otherwise doctors will be
discredited as a source of education, for
individual patients “will not come forward if
doctors are going to squeal on them.”
Consequently, confidentiality is vital to
secure public as well as private health, for
unless those infected come forward they
cannot be counseled and self-treatment
does not provide the best care.’66
The same view has continued to
underscore judicial reasoning since the
commencement of the Human Rights Act
1998. For example in Campbell v MGN,
Baroness Hale and Lord Hope indicated
that a critical question was whether
disclosure of information about Campbell’s
drug rehabilitation by the newspaper
would disrupt drug treatment services.67
4.2.2 Privacy and confidentiality
preserves an important realm of
autonomous decision-making
Since the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Human Rights Act
1998, judges have more commonly
described privacy as a right drawn from
personal autonomy. The right to privacy is
engaged when a person’s opportunity to
determine (i.e. choose) how their
information is used is compromised.68
This may be because the information is
used without their authorisation, or
because the information is passed on to a
third party without them choosing that this
should occur. Lord Hoffmann lent support
to this theory in Campbell v MGN: ‘[since
the Human Rights Act 1998] [the breach of
confidence action] focuses upon the
protection of human autonomy and
dignity—the right to control the
dissemination of information about one’s
private life…’69 And later: ‘I should have
thought that the extent to which
information about one’s state of health,
including drug dependency, should be
communicated to other people was plainly
something which an individual was entitled
to decide for herself.’70 Baroness Hale
was influenced by similar thinking about
privacy in her dissenting speech in ex p S
and Marper. She cited approvingly the
following words from the Canadian Privacy
Commissioner, as a basis for explaining
the importance of decisional freedom:71
‘[w]e are all entitled to expect enough
control over what is known about us to live
with dignity and to be free to experience
33
HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIVACY AND MEDICAL RESEARCH
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67 Campbell v MGN paras 81 (Lord Hope), 165 (Lord Carswell).
68 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 (CA), 1001 (Sedley LJ). 
69 Campbell v MGN para 51 (Lord Hoffman).
70 Campbell v MGN para 53 (Lord Hoffman).
71 ex p S and Marper para. 69.
our individuality. Our fundamental rights
and freedoms—of thought, belief,
expression and association—depend in
part upon a meaningful measure of
individual privacy. Unless we each retain
the power to decide who should know our
political allegiances, our sexual
preferences, our confidences, our fears
and aspirations, then the very basis of a
civilised, free and democratic society could
be undermined.’72
It is significant, however, that both Lord
Hoffmann in Campbell v MGN and
Baroness Hale in ex p S and Marper
concluded that the interference was
necessary and proportionate, ultimately
dismissing the appellants’ complaints.
4.2.3 Privacy and confidentiality
preserves the patient’s right to the
esteem and respect of other people
The idea that privacy and confidentiality
preserves the patient’s right to the esteem
and respect of other people is evident in
passages where judges focus on the need
to protect the way in which an individual is
perceived by other people. For example,
Lord Hoffmann said in Campbell v MGN:
‘in my opinion, therefore, the widespread
publication of a photograph of someone
which reveals him to be in a situation of
humiliation or severe embarrassment,
even if taken in a public place, may be an
infringement of the privacy of his personal
information.’73 This approach to privacy
also explains why the courts have held
that there is no breach of confidentiality
where a newspaper publishes information
to correct untrue statements or false
images that a public figure circulates about
themselves. The underlying rationale is
that the individual forfeits their right to
esteem and respect of other people
through their deceit; the public is entitled
to know that their esteem is misplaced. It
also explains why judges are concerned
only to protect sensitive information. For
example, Lord Nicholls indicated there is
little significance in a disclosure that a
person who has fractured a limb has his
limb in plaster or that a person suffering
from cancer is undergoing a course of
chemotherapy, or (as in Campbell v MGN)
that a person with a serious drug problem
is attending Narcotics Anonymous
meetings.74 Innocuous information of a
predictable kind does not affect the
esteem and respect of other people.75
4.2.4 Privacy protects a zone of
inviolate personal space
Occasionally judges equate the value of
privacy with inviolate personal space. This
approach is exemplified by Lord
Hoffmann’s approving reference in
Campbell v MGN to Lord Mustill’s
statement: ‘An infringement of privacy is
an affront to the personality, which is
damaged both by the violation and by the
demonstration that the personal space is
not inviolate.’76 Based on this, several of
their Lordships, including Lords Hoffmann
and Hope, were prepared to find that
covert surveillance interfered with the right
to privacy.77 It also seems that this
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72 Canadian Privacy Commissioner, Genetic Testing and Privacy, 1995: 2.
73 Campbell v MGN para. 75 (Lord Hoffmann).
74 Campbell v MGN para. 26 (Lord Nicholls). Note that the wording suggests Lord Nicholls’ comment was premised on the idea that
one already knew that the limb was fractured and that the person suffered from cancer.
75 See also Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] E.M.L.R. 22 for another instance where this approach was adopted.
76 As Lord Mustill said in R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p BBC [2000] 3 All ER 989 at 1002, [2001] QB 885 at 900
(para. 48).
77 Campbell v MGN paras 74, 121-122.
approach was an undercurrent in the
majority’s reasoning in ex p S and Marper,
in so far as their Lordships held that
unauthorised retention was not
interference in privacy or at most a minor
interference. Their Lordships seemed
implicitly to interpret the right to privacy to
be a right to be inaccessible rather than a
right to control information about oneself.
Since the DNA samples were not stored in
a publicly accessible form and individuals
were not identifiable to the untutored eye
simply from the profile on the database,
their Lordships felt that non-consensual
retention did not raise an issue of
privacy.78
4.3 Protection of privacy since the
Human Rights Act 1998
In each of these approaches, judges have
identified a different way in which people
can be harmed when their information is
handled without their consent. Many
judges make reference to more than one
of the four ideological approaches, and
very often judges on the same Bench
disagree with one another about the
interests at stake in a particular context.
Further research is necessary to ascertain
if there is a clear trend towards a dominant
view. However, even without this analysis,
an interesting dynamic emerges. 
Despite their multiple understandings, all
judges are committed to the view that
whatever the justification for privacy and
confidentiality, it is not an absolute value
and interference with it is lawful provided it
is proportionate and necessary for a
legitimate aim. The primary explanation for
judges adopting this approach is that it
comports with human rights legislation and
the common law. However a subsidiary
reason, which explains why the judges
have so readily adapted their reasoning to
these principles, is that it sets up a
framework that achieves an overlapping
consensus between competing ideologies
of privacy.79 Thus, whatever their
differences when it comes to explaining
the moral value of privacy, judges find the
idea that breaches of privacy are
acceptable where they are necessary and
proportionate to be one that they can
willingly accept when it comes to setting
legally binding standards of behaviour.
Even judges who believe that an individual
is harmed by being denied the choice to
decide how their information is used
(irrespective of any pecuniary, physical or
psychological harm) have agreed with
other judges in cases concerning DNA and
health information that use and disclosure
of that information did not, in the
circumstances, amount to a breach of the
law because it was a necessary and
proportionate interference.
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79 The significance of an overlapping consensus between competing moral ideologies for law and legal policy-making is explained in
more detail in: K. Liddell, Biolaw and Deliberative Democracy (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2003).
Prior to the introduction of the Human
Rights Act 1998, two peculiar legal
dynamics affected the use of health
information. On the one hand, the law
courts had ruled that English law did not
protect privacy. Accordingly, when a
newspaper published an unauthorised
interview and photos of a media
personality recovering from a motor
vehicle accident, the Court of Appeal said
there was no basis on which it could
award compensation.80 On the other
hand, commentators seemed to conclude
from other cases (e.g. W v Egdell81) that
medical professionals owed a duty of
confidentiality of the strictest kind such
that they were not permitted to disclose
medical information without consent,
except where non-disclosure posed a
serious and imminent risk to another
person’s health or safety. In part
influenced by these interpretations of a
doctor’s duty of confidence and in part by
concerns about the implications of the
Data Protection Act 1998 the GMC
advised doctors that they should not
disclose cancer diagnoses or other non-
reportable diseases to public health
registries without the consent of patients.
Against this background the
commencement of the Human Rights Act
1998 in 2000 was an interesting
development. Would it broaden patients’
rights to privacy and confirm the strength
of that right in the face of public health
monitoring and research? Early indications
suggested that the Human Rights Act
1998 might indeed be a watershed for
broadening legal rights of privacy. In
Douglas v Hello!, Sedley LJ said:
‘The courts have done what they can,
using such legal tools as were to hand, to
stop the more outrageous invasions of
individuals’ privacy; but they have felt
unable to articulate their measures as a
discrete principle of law. Nevertheless, we
have reached a point at which it can be
said with confidence that the law
recognises and will appropriately protect a
right of personal privacy. The reasons are
twofold. First, equity and the common law
are today in a position to respond to an
increasingly invasive social environment
by affirming that everybody has a right to
some private space. Secondly, and in any
event, the Human Rights Act 1998
requires the courts of this country to give
appropriate effect to the right to respect for
private and family life set out in article 8 of
the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. …. What a
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80 Mr Kaye’s Counsel did not however expressly ask the court to consider whether there had been a breach of confidence.
81 This would seem however to be based on an overly strict reading of W v. Egdell. Egdell was a case where the information was
highly sensitive information about the patient’s mental state and the disclosure carried serious consequences for his liberty. The
confidentiality interest was thus very strong. To justify his disclosure without consent, Dr Egdell needed to show strong countervailing
factors. Imminent risk to public safety might have helped establish this. It was not however an essential criterion. All three appeal
judges agreed that Dr Egdell was clearly justified in making the disclosure. Only Lord Justice Bingham (as he was then) commented
on the imminence of risk, and he found it was not immediately pressing but nevertheless of sufficient concern and, contrary to
submissions from W’s counsel, an important opportunity to take action: ‘it appeared to be only a matter of time, and probably not a
very long time, before W [might journey back into the community]’. Of greater salience to future cases was the unanimous conclusion
that the case called for a ‘balancing operation’ that took account of ‘the special facts of the case’. If the information in Egdell had been
less sensitive and the consequences of disclosure less damaging for the patient, it is reasonable to speculate that the court would not
have required such a serious threat to public safety to justify disclosure. Indeed in obiter dicta their Lordships countenanced the
disclosure of medical information for research. Brown LJ noted that GMC guidance permitted information to be disclosed without
consent for the purpose of an ethically approved medical research project, and Bingham LJ indicated that a doctor might discuss a
case in a learned article if he took appropriate steps (i.e. practical and reasonable) to conceal the identity of W.
concept of privacy does, however, is
accord recognition to the fact that the law
has to protect not only those people
whose trust has been abused but also
those who simply find themselves
subjected to an unwanted intrusion into
their personal lives. The law no longer
needs to construct an artificial relationship
of confidentiality between intruder and
victim: it can recognise privacy itself as a
legal principle drawn from the fundamental
value of personal autonomy.’82
However, the courts quickly drew back
from the suggestion that English law might
recognise a specific tort of privacy.83
Rather than take the view that the 1998
Act creates a new cause of action
between private persons,84 judges argued
that the impact of the Human Rights Act
1998 was principally to clarify that the
breach of confidence action enshrined the
values of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Most significantly, this meant that a duty to
keep information confidential could be
owed in the absence of a pre-existing
relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant (e.g. between a newspaper and
the subject of its scoop). It also meant that
the courts would be more inclined to view
information as confidential if it were
sensitive or offensive (putting less
emphasis on the question of whether the
information was already known to a few
members of the public). This shift had
already begun through the influence of the
European Convention on Human Rights,
but it became stronger and more definitive.
Lord Hoffmann put it thus:
‘What human rights law has done is to
identify private information as something
worth protecting as an aspect of human
autonomy and dignity. And this recognition
has raised inescapably the question of
why it should be worth protecting against
the state but not against a private person.
…The result of these developments has
been a shift in the centre of gravity of the
action for breach of confidence when it is
used as a remedy for the unjustified
publication of personal information. It
recognises that the incremental changes
to which I have referred do not merely
extend the duties arising traditionally from
a relationship of trust and confidence to a
wider range of people. As Sedley LJ
observed in a perceptive passage in his
judgment in Douglas v Hello! Ltd …, the
new approach takes a different view of the
underlying value which the law protects.
Instead of the cause of action being based
upon the duty of good faith applicable to
confidential personal information and trade
secrets alike, it focuses upon the
protection of human autonomy and
dignity—the right to control the
dissemination of information about one’s
private life and the right to the esteem and
respect of other people. These changes
have implications for the future
development of the law. They must
influence the approach of the courts to the
kind of information which is regarded as
entitled to protection, the extent and form
of publication which attracts a remedy and
the circumstances in which publication can
be justified.’85
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83 For example Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 A.C. 406 (HL) explained that privacy is a ‘principle only in the broadest sense’,
which directs the development of the recently expanded law of breach of confidence rather than a distinct tort.
84 Such development would have raised many complex questions about the boundaries of the action—e.g. what remedies and
defences apply, and how does the new action overlap with confidentiality and defamation?
85 Campbell v MGN paras 50-52 (Lord Hoffmann) (emphasis added).
These passages show that the Human
Rights Act 1998 expanded the protection
of personal information, though in a more
subtle and indirect manner than
anticipated. And what of the circumstances
in which non-consensual use and
disclosure might be permitted?
Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the
implementation of the Human Rights Act
1998 has at the same time extended and
tamed the duty of confidentiality by
clarifying the principle that confidential
information may be disclosed to support
the public interest. In decisions under the
Human Rights Act 1998, judges are
strongly responsive to the public interest in
sharing information, even sensitive
information. This is because the Human
Rights Act 1998 makes clear that the right
to privacy is subject to a number of
exceptions where interference is important
for social purposes (see Article 8(2)), and
furthermore that the right to privacy must
operate in conjunction with other
fundamental rights including the right of
free expression (see Article 10). Imminent
harm is no longer, if it ever was, a
necessary requirement.
Lord Hope and Baroness Hale’s speeches
in Campbell v MGN draw attention to the
conditioning that has become clearer since
the implementation of the Human Rights
Act 1998. Lord Hope said:
‘The language has changed following the
coming into operation of the Human Rights
Act 1998 and the incorporation into
domestic law of article 8 and article 10 of
the Convention. We now talk about the
right to respect for private life and the
countervailing right to freedom of
expression. The jurisprudence of the
European Court offers important guidance
as to how these competing rights ought to
be approached and analysed. …It seems
to me that the balancing exercise to which
that guidance is directed is essentially the
same exercise, although it is plainly now
more carefully focussed and more
penetrating.’86
Baroness Hale said:
‘[Articles 8 and 10] have provided new
parameters within which the court will
decide, in an action for breach of
confidence, whether a person is entitled to
have his privacy protected by the court or
whether the restriction of freedom of
expression which such protection involves
cannot be justified.’87
She described the circumstances in which
interference in fundamental rights was
permitted in the following way:
‘[Art 8 and 10 rights] may respectively be
interfered with or restricted provided that
three conditions are fulfilled. (a) The
interference or restriction must be “in
accordance with the law”; it must have a
basis in national law which conforms to
the convention standards of legality. (b) It
must pursue one of the legitimate aims set
out in each article. Article 8(2) provides for
“the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others”. Article 10(2) provides for “the
protection of the reputation or rights of
others” and for “preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence”. The
rights referred to may either be rights
protected under the national law or, as in
this case, other convention rights. (c)
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87 Campbell v MGN para. 132 (Baroness Hale) (emphasis added).
Above all, the interference or restriction
must be “necessary in a democratic
society”; it must meet a “pressing social
need” and be no greater than is
proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued; the reasons given for it must be
both “relevant” and “sufficient” for this
purpose. The application of the
proportionality test is more straightforward
when only one convention right is in play:
the question then is whether the private
right claimed offers sufficient justification
for the degree of interference with the
fundamental right.’88
Thus, from a legal perspective, the Human
Rights Act 1998 has in fact done as much
to limit the rights to confidentiality and
privacy as to extend them. Non-
consensual disclosure of private or
confidential information is permitted
provided the disclosure is necessary and
proportionate for the protection of public
health. Accordingly, the disclosure of
health information to public health
registries is likely to be permitted and the
use of personal information by medical
researchers might well be permitted in a
broad range of circumstances.
4.4 Court judgements and the value of
research
The phrases ‘likely’ and ‘might well’ used
above reflect an unavoidable element of
uncertainty. In this section we explore this
question a little further, examining a factor
that might influence court decisions: the
value society and government attaches to
medical research.
The approach of the courts in the two
cases discussed in 4.1—concerning
retention of DNA samples and treatment
for drug addiction—was to place society’s
interest in investigating crime and free
expression, respectively, in the balance
against privacy interests. The courts then
decided how to weigh that balance to
reach a decision. Michael Coleman, Barry
Evans and Geraldine Barrett thought that
medical research should be considered of
sufficient value to be weighed similarly in
any balancing act, but they also
recognised, indeed were deeply troubled
by, the fact that the media and some other
sections of society did not see it that way:
‘Expecting the police to protect society
against crime without a database of
identifiable information would be
considered absurd. Equally, asking the
Inland Revenue to ensure that we all pay
the right amount of income tax to the state
without an identifiable database would be
unthinkable. When the security of such
systems is breached, society does not
demand that they are closed down, or
even that the perpetrators are fired. In
2003, Inland Revenue staff were caught
trawling confidential tax databases both
maliciously (for information about ex-
spouses) and for profit, selling juicy
snippets about the tax affairs of celebrities
to tabloid newspapers. The press calmly
reported that new rules would be brought
in shortly. The contrast between press
criticism of legislation designed to tighten
the control of confidentiality in research
and the lenient reporting of repeated,
deliberate breaches of confidentiality for
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malice or profit in the Inland Revenue
could hardly be more striking. The press
clearly applies double standards when
reporting on confidentiality and the public
interest. Media treatment of a breach of
confidentiality by medical researchers,
whether accidental or deliberate, would
probably be very severe.’89
Therein lies the problem. The value
society attaches to research is important in
many ways. Perhaps less obviously, it
affects the decisions courts might make.
There is an inescapable political and
cultural dimension to the issue. ‘Society’
might seem too abstract a notion, and the
possibility of values directly affecting a
court decision too unmediated. However,
as we noted earlier, an obvious mediation
is the fact that the courts would seek
guidance from recent legislation and
professional guidance, among other
sources. If professional guidance is
infused with a defensive spirit and makes
suggestions and proposals that effectively
shift the balance away from research
interests towards privacy interests, this,
whilst not necessarily a decisive factor,
could nevertheless be important.
5 Conclusions: Directions,
Conflicts and Proposals
By contrasting the law on tissue and the
legal policy discussion of data on the one
side, with existing law and court
judgements on the other, we have
established that it is not the law that is the
primary driver towards a strict privacy
regime governing data. We have also
drawn attention to the large degree of
choice in the government’s decision to
move in the direction they did regarding
the law on human tissue.
In this concluding section we focus on the
direction of change indicated by
government policy, and attempts to modify
this by researchers and others. The
dominant trend is to reinforce informational
privacy interests (and move towards the
modification of data protection laws in line
with the schema laid down for tissue in the
HT Act). Professionals critical of the
government’s policy are aware that they
have a powerful and important story to tell,
and a degree of public support for their
case, but they remain uncomfortable with
the position in which they find
themselves—out of favour with sections of
the government and their values
questioned—and wary of presenting their
own concerns too forcefully in public.
5.1 Tissue and data: differences and
similarities
In discussions on the Human Tissue Bill,
the government highlighted some
differences between re-analysis of tissue
and use of existing data, with the
implication that this might lead to different
emphases in policy. Regarding research,
Lord Warner argued:
‘Many noble Lords have mentioned the
issue of research using residual samples
where the Bill allows for research without
consent, provided ethical approval is given
to the use of anonymised samples. The
questions are twofold. First, does
anonymised mean permanently unlinked?
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get it right?, Clinical Medicine, 2003, 3(3): 223-4.
I have already tried to indicate that it does
not. The Bill allows samples that are
anonymised in ways that will retain their
linkage to the clinical record. Secondly, is
it in fact necessary for such samples to be
anonymised in the first place? We
maintain that it is. While we recognise that
it is part of the duty of professionals to
maintain confidentiality in their handling of
patient information, we believe that the
use of tissue samples is not an identical
issue, especially the use of those samples
for research when the patient has not
given consent.’90
Baroness Andrews was more specific:
‘That is where the analogy made by the
noble Earl with the PIAG and the use of
data seems to fall down because data
protection concerns the use of existing
information, but the use of tissue concerns
the effort to derive new information. I
suggest, therefore, that different criteria
would apply.’91 Similarly, in relation to
comparing re-analysis of tissue to benefit
a relative with use of existing data for the
same purpose, Lord Warner argued in a
letter to Peers that: ‘In the debate,
analogies were drawn with data protection,
but using tissue is not the same as using
data. Data already exists, it may be held
by several people, and considerations of
its confidentiality are dealt with elsewhere
in legislation. The issue here is the use of
tissue to undergo a process that would
generate new information which the
person concerned might not want to have,
let alone want other people to have.’92
While there is a distinction to be made
between gaining new information and
using existing information, the
government’s attempt to equate this with a
distinction between analysing tissue and
using data is ultimately unconvincing. Re-
analysis of tissue may reveal nothing
particularly sensitive for the original donor.
In the context of examples given in
Section 1.2.2, it is hard to see how it is
obvious that an individual would have
more concern about analysis of tissue to
test for the expression of a gene, say, than
the release of existing, potentially sensitive
data.
5.1.1 Ask or anoymise
More straightforward is the overarching
approach to future developments taken by
the government and PIAG, despite
statements emphasising the potential
differences and their possible policy
implications. Many professional bodies are
working on the assumption that
government wants to move towards an
‘ask or anonymise’ system (and the
abolition of PIAG), and this is certainly the
impression we have gained in talking with
officials. Following the HT Act, and bearing
in mind the tight connection between
tissue and data in research, pressure will
be exerted in this direction.
Indeed, for the government, the HT Act is
part of a reconfiguration of research and
clinical practice, which is advanced as
being all of a piece with the agenda of
placing the patient at the centre of the
healthcare system, and covering both
tissue analysis and data handling. The
government argues that this is entirely
consistent with effective research and
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professional education. As Lord Warner
put it at Report Stage during the Lords’
consideration of the Human Tissue Bill:
‘This Bill is not just a reaction to Alder Hey.
We are not positing a false divide between
patients, doctors and researchers. It is part
of a whole process of developing a
patient-focused approach to health,
research and education. But as my right
honourable friend Alan Milburn said four
years ago, patient-centred consent-based
practice is not at odds with research and
education. On the contrary, it will be to our
advantage that we develop and encourage
the engagement of patients with these vital
activities that support our healthcare
system.’93
This contrasts with the view of many
researchers that the cumulative effect of
the government’s reforms, whilst not
actually blocking research (with some
exceptions), has been to hinder rather
than facilitate scientific and clinical
investigation.
5.2 The professionals’ perspective
Aware of the resilience of underlying
public sympathy, even support, for medical
research and practice, some philosophers,
policy makers and scientists would like,
tentatively perhaps, to put the case for the
scientists’ perspective rather than accept
and adapt to the contemporary drift in
policy.
5.2.1 Implied consent or a public
interest exception to consent?
Professor O’Neill has pressed the legal
and bioethical communities to reconsider
the issue from a philosophical perspective.
She argues that strict requirements for
explicit consent cannot and should not
substitute for relationships of trust between
individuals and institutions.94 Implicit in her
argument is the notion that recent legal
policy has missed the point and should
seek to promote relationships of trust
without being fixated on the idea of explicit
consent. 
Policy expert William Lowrance shares
these concerns and in 2002 he asked: ‘is
an updated version of implied consent
then the solution? Probably. With the
section 60 mechanism in place, the NHS
is proceeding as though this will become
the case. But evolution in this direction will
require a lot of driving, and ultimately the
decisions will be political…. Section 60 is
both a solution and a restatement of the
problem.’95
The legitimacy of the notion of implied
consent to research might be bolstered if
notices were more frequently posted in
hospitals to inform the public that tissue
taken and data gathered is routinely used
in research. But for ethical and legal
reasons we are not attracted to the idea
that implied consent simpliciter is the
solution. While the measures might be
practical, consent is properly valid only
where it is a true expression of agreement
(e.g. offering an arm for blood to be
taken). In our view it is better to
acknowledge that consent has not been
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given, and that research is justified
because it serves the public interest and
involves no more than a proportionate
interference in the individual’s right to
privacy. 
As we outlined in section 3.3, in our view
research without full anonymisation or
consent is more likely to be justified
where:
l researchers are dealing with data 
from a large number of data 
subjects;
l a large proportion of data subjects 
are untraceable; 
l there is a serious risk of introducing 
bias that will jeopardise the validity 
of the results or a risk that people 
may be harmed through being 
contacted; 
l there is a serious cost burden in 
seeking consent; 
l the research does not involve direct 
contact with the data subjects (i.e. it 
is secondary research);
l information is anonymised as soon 
as possible and to the extent 
possible; 
l highly sensitive information is 
segregated and not used; 
l people with access to the data have 
signed contracts which subject them 
to discipline or penalty for 
mishandling information; 
l approval is obtained from an 
appropriate research ethics 
committee; 
l the data is protected by strong 
security systems; and 
l strong efforts are made to respect 
the choices of the patients who 
specifically indicate that they do not 
wish their information to be used in 
research. 
5.2.2 Key studies
Two important studies by the Medical
Research Council (MRC) and The
Academy of Medical Sciences96 have
examined the use of patient data in
research, in particular the secondary use
of data, against the background of
contemporary concerns. Together they
have highlighted, among other points: 
l the importance of and varied types 
of research using existing data;
l the conflict between stringent 
regulation and the desire to facilitate 
cost effective secondary research; 
l that full anonymisation is often not 
possible and if achieved it can 
undermine, even destroy, the value 
of the data collection concerned.
l that many of the most promising 
research opportunities involve 
comparing and integrating data from 
different sources (such as different 
databases and / or clinical records), 
and between different disciplines 
and organisations;
l that it is often necessary to handle 
identifiable data when bringing 
different data sets together to avoid 
errors, and that this is a difficult job, 
often better done by researchers 
than by third parties less familiar 
with the issues and pitfalls;
l that the insistence or strong 
preference of RECs that in seeking 
consent to research contact be 
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made by clinicians or a GP known to 
the patient rather than the 
researcher is creating a barrier to 
effective research using identifiable 
data; and
l that in turn this encourages the use 
of anonymised data, which may 
have costs in terms of the 
effectiveness of the research, since 
it can often lead to the loss of useful 
information.
The Academy’s recent report in particular
provides a detailed and clear analysis
(aided by many examples) of the issues
from the professional perspective. Of
particular note is a thorough examination
of the laws covering the use of data in the
UK (Chapter two) and a powerful defence
of the need for researchers to access
identifiable data without clear consent in
certain circumstances (Chapter three). In
summary, on this latter point, they write:
‘Most types of research using personal
data require access to identifiable data at
some point for some purposes. If
researchers are not allowed access to the
key to coded data, those that do hold the
key (i.e. GP practices and hospital trusts)
will need to undertake many tasks on
behalf of the research teams. This
includes many of the processes described
in the previous section, including linkage
to eliminate double-counting, addition of
follow up data on a regular basis,
amalgamation of data sets from different
sources, as well as validation both
internally and against external standards
such as paper records. Experience shows
that these are not straightforward tasks
and the quality with which they are
undertaken determines the quality of the
subsequent research.
The additional level of security gained
from pseudonymisation (where
researchers do not have access to the key
codifying the data set) is extremely small
compared with the use of coded
identifiable data sets by academic
research groups operating under a strict
security policy.’97
5.3 Medical research and the public
interest
The government is, in a broad sense, in
favour of medical research. Indeed it
wishes to promote it. Sections of the
government and some regulators are also
sympathetic to some of the researchers’
concerns. The tension arises from the
conflict between the needs of research
and the government’s promotion of
consumer choice and patient-centred care
and research. Indeed, catalysed by the
publication of the Human Tissue Bill, the
past few years have witnessed a partial
breakdown in the usual channels of
communication between the medical
establishment and the government.
In addition to feeling the cool wind of
disapproval, clinicians and researchers
were presented with a Bill (the initial draft
of the Human Tissue Bill as introduced
into the House of Commons) into which
they had had minimal input, forcing them
into a process of semi-public lobbying,
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with which they were uncomfortable.
Some ground was clawed back, especially
during the debate in the Lords. However,
reluctant publicly to challenge the rhetoric
of patient-centred care and research in the
post Alder Hey world, the medical and
research community remained to a large
extent on the back foot.
In 2003, Coleman et al called on
government to ‘consider carrying out a
careful survey of public opinion, large
enough to be statistically robust, and with
suitable background information to enable
adequate responses.’ The results, they
added, ‘should be the basis of wider
debate aimed at reaching a settled public
consensus.’98 Similarly, the Academy of
Medical Sciences calls on the Department
of Health to ‘undertake a programme of
public engagement around these
issues.’99
It would undoubtedly help the medical
profession in its negotiations with the
government if it were able to show that
patients and the wider public are
supportive of the means as well as the
ends of medical research, based on an
appreciation of the reality of research
practice. There is every chance that such
a detailed survey of a representative
sample of the population would make
manifest what many believe is still there
waiting to be revealed: broad public
support for medical research carried out in
the public interest, even if consent cannot
be gathered in all cases.
But whether or not such surveys are
undertaken, the case for medical research
and its methods, carried out in the public
interest, needs to be made in a clear and
public way. The direction taken by the
government’s thinking, most clearly
expressed in the HT Act, suggests to us
that professionals and others of a similar
mind (including some or many patients)
need to take a lead on this themselves,
rather than hoping the government will do
it for them.
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The Genetic Interest Group (GIG) is a national alliance of patient organisations with a membership of
over 130 charities which support children, families and individuals affected by genetic disorders.
GIG's primary goals are:
l To promote awareness and understanding of genetic disorders so that high quality services for 
people affected by genetic conditions are developed and made available to all who need them. 
l GIG seeks to educate and raise awareness amongst opinion formers, people of influence and the 
public about human genetics and genetic disorders. 
l GIG provides a common platform from which effective programmes can be launched to raise 
awareness, inform the media and influence government, industry and the NHS
l GIG focuses on issues of policy and practice keeping an active watch on developments within the 
UK and Europe that will influence the effective transfer of knowledge and understanding into 
products and services for families that are supported by our member groups
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